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
THE USS PUEBLO INCIDENT WARNING CYCLE(U) DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE COLL WASHINGTON DC K D KOEBKE 10 SEP 84


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"The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government."

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ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: The U.S.S. Pueblo Incident, Warning Cycle

Kent Donald Koebke, Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence, August 1984

Thesis Committee Chairman: Jo H. Kinkaid

The topic studied in the thesis was "What intelligence lessons can be learned from the Warning Cycle of the U.S.S. Pueblo Crisis?" The basic method used in the study was a historical examination of the Warning Cycle and a quantitative evaluation of three portions of the cycle, i.e., risk assessment, the actual warning and the communications. Risk assessment was defined so that it met the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) criteria standard and was informative to all units up the chain of command with a single point of contact. The warning portion of the cycle was defined in terms of a single point of contact and its responsiveness to the system. Communications effectiveness was assessed using a 10 minute criteria for a net to be responsive to a Critic/Pinnacle message. The procedures that were actually used during the crisis were compared to the standards set by the definitions.

The results in each of these areas is that:

1. The risk assessment procedures that were used at Commander Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAP) did not meet JCS established criteria. COMNAVFORJAP used its own criteria, forwarding up the chain a "minimal" risk assessment, with no justification. Lacking justification, the process did not adequately inform all units why the specific assessment was given. This is a major drawback since dissenting views could have been covered over and over. Also there was no single point of responsibility used in the risk assessment process.

2. The warning portion of the cycle further demonstrated the problems associated with a lack of central control. Warnings given by the North Koreans were considered noise or propaganda and not indicative of their intent. Also an advisory message from the National Security Agency (NSA) on the Pueblo mission was not properly integrated into the risk assessment nor was it added to the North Korean warnings and used to calculate the probabilities of certain events happening on the Pueblo mission. The end result was that no quantitative guidance was given to CDR Bucher, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Pueblo.

3. Communications problems identified in the incident reflected a lack of training in the use of nets and equipment prior to the mission.

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Finally, the thesis presents possible procedures that could have been used to solve all of the above problems. The major point is that a single point of contact/control was necessary to control such a mission.

The importance of the thesis is that it can be used as an initial step in studying intelligence collection crises. By comparing trends in this and other crises, it may be possible to detect common problems. With such a background, current procedures could be more effectively studied to detect flaws.

THE U.S.S. PUEBLO INCIDENT, WARNING CYCLE

by

Kent Donald Koebke

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Defense Intelligence
College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence
July 1984

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
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CHAPTER I: Introduction

Many intelligence lessons were learned as a result of government inquiries completed immediately after the return of the USS Pueblo crew. Several of the crew have since written their personal accounts of the incident, putting forward their particular version of events. The most extensive reporting on the Pueblo incident was done by independent journalists. However, since these accounts were written either from non-intelligence sources or from an individual perspective, there is a lack of serious academic literature.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify what lessons can be learned from the USS Pueblo incident by analyzing the following areas; risk assessment, communications, and the total warning cycle. To understand the warning cycle, first it must be defined:

Figure i: Warning Cycle¹



The warning cycle starts with intelligence and information being collected. An analyst then estimates the enemies' capabilities and intentions. The analyst can then decide a risk assessment for the specific missions from a generic list of indicators. Then a specific list of indicators is developed. From the list of indicators, a template of possible events with probabilities is determined.

After the Warning has been given the decision maker has to decide what action to take. LtCol Timothy Laur, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D. C., January 1984 stated, "There is a debate as to whether taking an action means the decision maker must actually do something, (a theory supported by Dr. Thomas G. Belden) or that the decision maker can accept the warning but he does not have to physically take an action, as supported by Mr. Richard Betts." In any warning cycle the process is not totally sequential. The cycle may jump backwards many times before it moves forward.

Each of the areas studied is interrelated in assessing support for an intelligence collection activity. Hopefully by understanding these intelligence lessons, decision makers will apply them to future operations and consciously decide on appropriate courses of action. To comprehend the specific lessons derived from studying the Pueblo incident, one needs a basic understanding of the entire mission.

Dr. Eugene G. Fubini was the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering) in 1965, and was considered by many experts in the Pentagon as one of the U.S.'s top authorities on electronic espionage. Dr. Fubini had worked with intelligence collection systems in Washington, D.C. since 1961. During his tenure in the Pentagon, he became concerned with Soviet naval capabilities and intentions, and the U.S.'s ability to collect information on Moscow's fleet. The Soviet fleet size was increasing and challenging U.S. supremacy on the seas. He was also aware of the Soviet Naval Intelligence collection effort against the U.S. Naval forces by using Soviet "fishing trawlers". Fubini's first proposal was to build a similar U.S. trawler fleet. However, this was quickly dismissed, due to the extreme expense of such an endeavor. Another option, the building of Auxiliary General Technical Research ships (AGTR) as collection platforms, was also deemed too expensive. Moreover, these ships might have been susceptible to National tasking, which would detract from their use by the Navy.

Dr. Fubini, Admiral David L. McDonald (Chief of Operations), Rear Admiral Frederick J. Hartfinger II (Assistant Director for Collections at Defense Intelligence Agency), Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor (Director of Naval Intelligence) and Captain Ralph Cash (Director Naval Security Group) finally decided on a three-part plan to meet the Navy's need.²

The first phase involved sending a lone ship to the Western Pacific to test the feasibility of the operation. After a short search the Navy found the USS Banner, a small ship transporting coconuts in the Marianas. The Navy spent \$1,500,000 (not including communications equipment) and less than seven weeks working on her in Bremerton, Washington. After the conversion the Banner skipped the normal sea trials episode,³ and proceeded directly to Yokosuka, Japan. The Banner conducted numerous surveillance operations in the Western Pacific from 1965 to 1967.

In April 1966, the Navy decided to extend their collection effort by refitting two vessels the USS Pueblo and the USS Palm Beach.⁴

The USS Pueblo was built in Kewanee, Wisconsin and launched in 1944 as a general-purpose Army supply ship. Her primary mission was to transport supplies in the South Pacific. After World War II, FS 344 was lent to the South Korean government and in 1954, she was moth-balled. The Navy in 1966 renamed FS 344 as the USS Pueblo and classified her an Auxiliary light-cargo ship (AKL 44). She was 176 1/2 feet long with a 10 foot draft and a 32 feet 9 inch beam.⁵ She had two diesel engines that could produce a 12.2 knot maximum speed. The following figures ii, iii, and iv depict the ship's relative size and space design.^{6,7,8}

Figure ii: Ship Size



U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (UN)--1,000 ft., 85000 tons




"GEARING" CLASS DESTROYER--390 ft., 3500 tons



U.S.S. PUEBLO--179 ft., 970 tons

COMPARATIVE SIZE OF "PUEBLO"
(approximate scale)


Figure iii: Ship Structure, Top View



- A. Radio Room
- B. Chart Room
- C. MG 50
- D. Alternate Mount

Figure iii: Ship Structure, Top View

Figure iv: Ship Structure, Side View



INBOARD PROFILE

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| A. Stack | I. Steering Engine |
| B. Chart Room | J. Crew's Berthing |
| C. Pilot House | K. Engine Room |
| D. Crew's Mess | L. Aux. Machinery Room |
| E. Engine Room | M. Ship's Office |
| F. Staterooms | N. CPO's Berth |
| G. Electronics Spaces | O. Photo Lab |
| H. SOD Hut | P. Crew's Berthing |

Figure iv: Ship Structure, Side View

The ship's conversion took place in Bremerton, Washington. Although the Navy assumed that the conversion would be identical to that of the Banner, the ships were quite different. The Pueblo was much smaller than the Banner or the Palm Beach and was a new class of ship, lacking operational manuals or information on how to prepare her for her mission. On 1 June 1967, shortly after the Pueblo was commissioned, AKL class ships were reclassified Auxiliary General Environmental Research ships (AGER). Her basic problems included poor steerage, limited classified materials destruction equipment, and a crew of 83 on a ship that would normally carry 30. Commander Bucher, the ship's Commanding Officer was so concerned about the destruction equipment that he sent the Chief of Naval Operations the following message.

"The scope of security sensitive equipment aboard...renders their quick destruction impossible using conventional means; i.e. fire ax, sledge hammer, destruction bags. An explosive destruction means should be provided to the ship which will enable (me) to thoroughly destroy all sensitive classified materials quickly should the need arise..."

During a ship's refitting, normally the crew would go through special training on how to react in emergency situations. Since this ship was rushing to be refitted, there was not enough time to conduct the training. The crew was to receive on-the-job training (OJT) during its sea trials, in August 1967. Later that month, the ship completed a Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) test,

which ran three days. The Board summarized the problems on the Pueblo as follows:

...Stability of Pueblo is markedly less than that of Palm Beach...The adequacy of stability of Pueblo appears deficient...Excessive rolling is a common complaint...bilge keels should have been incorporated in conversion of Pueblo...Chairs are loose and unsecured to the deck...In heavy weather serious damage is very likely to occur to valuable materials, as well as possibility of injury to operating personnel...Present whaleboat is not suited for emergency use...(it) was not intended by design and was chosen contrary to ship's plans or warnings given...Steering gear unreliable and failed repeatedly during trials. Full power ahead and astern steering trials not satisfactorily demonstrated. Rudder hangs up and sticks...when shifting from hard left to hard right and vice versa...¹⁰

About this time, after the Chief of Naval Operations determined that all ships should have defensive weapons, the Pueblo received two .50 caliber machine guns.

By 11 September the Pueblo had most of the outlined (INSURV) deficiencies corrected and headed for San Diego, California, for her shakedown training. During the next two months the finishing touches and minor problems were supposedly corrected. However, as noted by Commander Bucher, the ship still had steering problems and in fact two full pages of log entries had been compiled on the problems.

On 6 November, the Pueblo set sail for Hawaii before heading to Japan for operations. In Hawaii, Commander Bucher called on his administrative commander, Rear Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet (COMSERFORPACFLT). He noted the ship's steering problems, and was assured by the Admiral that the maintenance crews

would do what they could. Commander Bucher also called on the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). Although CINCPACFLT's Intelligence branch provided current intelligence to Commander Bucher the branch lacked sufficient knowledge of the North Korean problem.¹¹ Commander Bucher was assured by Read Admiral George L. Cassell at CINCPACFLT that in case of emergency the U.S. would retaliate within 24 to 48 hours--in force. Finally, while at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the Naval Security Group sent CDR Norman Horowitz and LT Robert E. Nisbett to look informally at the Security Group spaces on board the ship. They provided guidance to LT Steve Harris on equipment matters and were generally impressed by the ship and her crew. On 18 November, the ship left Hawaii for Yokosuka, Japan and shortly after the transit received operational orders from Rear Admiral Johnson, Commander Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAP), the ship's Operational Commander (see Appendix A). Commander Bucher and LT Harris had a multiple and complex chain of command from the Pueblo. Rear Admiral Johnson was dual-hatted as Commander Task Force (CTF) 96 and as such issued the sailing orders for the Pueblo, Appendix B. As CTF 96, Rear Admiral Johnson controlled only two ships, the Banner and the Pueblo. He was the Operational Commander while they were at sea. While in port, the Operational Commander for the Pueblo was Commander of the Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral William F. Bringle and administrative control was by the Commander, Service Group

Three, Rear Admiral Norbell G. Ward. Technical control for the Naval Security Group Detachment on board the ship was by the Director, Naval Security Group, Pacific. The ship's company was divided between the regular ship's crew and the Naval Security Group Detachment on board. Appendix C lists the ship's crew at the time of their first mission. While the Pueblo was in Yokosuka, Commander Bucher, LT Murphy and LT Harris voiced the following problems; unreliable steering control, to many classified publications on the ship, inefficient communications equipment and the lack of emergency destruction equipment. Each problem was addressed to the responsible COMNAVFORJAP staff member. The steering problem was reexamined and the other problems were recognized by the staff, however, each was a long range problem that needed to be addressed to a higher headquarters, therefore no immediate action was taken.

On 5 January, the Pueblo sailed for Sasebo, Japan, her last stop before heading out for her mission on 11 January. The steering problem appeared to have been corrected, as the ship did not encounter trouble in sailing to Sasebo.¹²

From Sasebo, the Pueblo headed north through the Tsushima Strait. To avoid detection, Commander Bucher hugged the Japanese coastline. Though with all of the antennas on board, the ship's true mission was hardly a secret. On the 12th of January, the Pueblo successfully reached Korean waters apparently undetected by other vessels. The ship then headed north along the coast to

begin surveillance just south of Vladivostok, U.S.S.R. On 16 January, as the ship finally commenced operations, Commander Bucher reconsidered his decision to have the Officer of the Deck (OOD) run the ship from the Conning tower. The tower was exposed to the icy weather and totally indefensible. The ship's only protection was two .50 caliber machine guns and ten Thompson submachine guns. The .50 caliber machine guns were positioned in the fore and aft of the ship but were covered so as not to provoke battle action.¹³ Commander Bucher preferred running the Pueblo like a submarine, despite the possible hindrances.

On 16 January the ship headed south, paralleling the coast of North Korea, approximately 13 miles off shore. The ship came to within 12.8 miles of land while Commander Bucher was trying to minimize the roll.¹⁴ This was well outside the 12 mile North Korean coastal limit and the 3 mile territorial coastal limit recognized by the U.S.

At dusk on 21 January, a North Korean SO-1 subchaser came within 500 yards of the Pueblo. Commander Bucher, believing that the Pueblo had not been seen did not break Emission Control by sending a report. While on station just outside Wonson harbor, at 12:25 local time on 22 January, the Pueblo was apparently spotted by two North Korean fishing vessels. LT Murphy identified the vessels as Rice Paddy I and II and, using dead reckoning fixes (DR), loran, radar and fathometer, positioned the Pueblo 20 miles from the nearest land mass.¹⁵ LT Schumacher made out a situation

report, however it took 14 hours to have it transmitted to COMNAVFORJAP.¹⁶ The fishing vessels returned later that day with cameras and took several pictures of the Pueblo.¹⁷

The USS Pueblo was captured the following day. A detailed chronology of the event will be discussed in the next two chapters. At this point it is only necessary to understand that the Pueblo was confronted by two North Korean SO-1 subchasers and four P-4 PT boats at approximately 1200 local time. By 1432, the North Koreans had boarded the ship and were in total control of the situation. The Pueblo was docked in Wonsan by 1900 hours local. The U.S. did not react with positive physical military action that day or in the days to follow, but succumbed to North Korean coercion and attempted to handle the matter through diplomatic channels.

For the next year the U.S. negotiated for the return of the crew, trying to save as much face as possible. The importance of this period will be addressed in the study, by looking at the effect it had on the crew. This is relative to the study because the primary source materials were either authored by the Pueblo's crew or the North Korean government. Obviously both sources have a definite bias. The bias that the Pueblo crew members may have is compounded by the fact that each was held in captivity for 11 months and a great deal of detail was lost through time and mental anguish. The crew went through great psychological stress while in the hands of the North Koreans.¹⁸ One of them was

killed during the capture and several others were injured. The pervading air of despair was marked by at least four attempted suicides. Upon release, the crew went through the culture shock of family reunions and national notoriety that was not always favorable. I mention all of the above to show that emotions and time may have acted on the primary and secondary source documents.

Finally, the ship's logs are still held by the North Korean government, making it difficult to clarify contradicting accounts. This problem applies particularly to the stories of Commander Bucher, LT Murphy and LT Harris. There are many contradictions between them, but no supporting documents are available to determine the truth.

The crew was subjected to numerous press interviews while in captivity, and was forced to sign confessions admitting espionage against the North Korean government. Finally, on 23 December 1968, General Woodward, at Panmunjon, signed an official confession and a receipt for 82 men and one corpse, (see Appendix E). This ended the captivity for the crew of the USS Pueblo but by no means signaled the end of the incident. Following a short physical examination and Christmas leave, the crew was individually interviewed by Military Intelligence and on 20 January 1968, a Naval Court of Inquiry was established. The court, headed by Vice Admiral Harold Bowen, Jr., and assisted by four Rear Admirals, was convened at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, California.

Witnesses included the entire crew and other significant persons in the Pueblo's chain of command. After five months the Court's findings were:

Commander Bucher would stand before a general court-martial for five alleged offenses: "permitting his ship to be searched while he had the power to resist; failing to take immediate and aggressive protective measures when his ship was attacked by the North Korean forces; complying with the orders of the North Korean forces to follow them into port; negligently failing to complete destruction of classified material aboard the USS Pueblo and permitting such material to fall into the hands of the North Koreans; and negligently failing to ensure, before departure for sea, that his officers and crew were properly organized, stationed, and trained in preparation for emergency destruction of classified material".

Trial by general court-martial was also recommended by the Court of Inquiry for Lieutenant Stephen Harris. As officer in charge of the Pueblo's research detachment, Harris was alleged to be derelict in his duties "in that he failed to inform the Commanding Officer of the Pueblo of a certain deficiency in the classified support capabilities of the research detachment in proper emergency destruction procedures; and failed to take effective action to complete emergency destruction after having been ordered by the Commanding Officer to dispose of all remaining classified materials".

For Lieutenant Edward R. Murphy, Jr., the court had recommended non-judicial punishment, in the form of a letter of admonition, for "alleged dereliction in the performance of his duties as Executive Officer, in that he negligently failed to organize the crew on the day of seizure, especially in the ship's major internal task of emergency destruction of classified material".

For Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson and Captain Everett B. Gladding, the court charged that Admiral Johnson, Commander of Naval Forces, Japan at the time of the seizure, "was derelict in the performance of duty in negligently failing to plan properly for effective emergency support forces for contingencies such as occurred during the

execution of the Pueblo's mission, and negligently failing to verify effectively the feasibility of rapid emergency destruction of classified equipment and documents carried by the Pueblo research detachment".¹⁹

Admiral Hyland, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific fleet had "recommended diminishing the court's recommendations for courts-martial for Commander Bucher and Lieutenant Harris to letters of reprimand." Admiral Hyland sustained the reprimand for Admiral Johnson and the lesser admonishment for Lieutenant Murphy, and exonerated Captain Gladding. The Chief of Naval Operations, who had final military authority in this matter concurred with Admiral Hyland's recommendations.²⁰

Then on 6 May, the Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chafee, made the following statement:

"The court of inquiry has completed its proceedings...As a result of my review, I have decided that no disciplinary action will be taken against any of the personnel involved in the Pueblo incident...I make no judgement regarding the guilt or innocence of any of the officers of the offenses alleged against them...I am convinced, however, that neither...the state of discipline or morale in the Navy nor any other interests require further legal proceedings...with respect to Commander Bucher, Lieutenant Murphy and Lieutenant Harris, it is my opinion that...they have suffered enough..."²¹

By this statement he officially closed the Pueblo matter.

The following chapters will examine specific intelligence lessons derived from the USS Pueblo incident. This thesis is not designed to point blame at any

individual, but to study the warning cycle and point out defects in the system.

NOTES

¹Henry J. Basedow, "Operation Hindsight: Communist Mass Media as a Source of Crisis Indications", (Defense Intelligence College, March 1970) p. 24.

²Trevor Armbrister, A matter of Accountability: A True Story of the Pueblo Affair, (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970) p. 84.

³Armbrister, p. 87.

⁴Ed Brandt, The Last Voyage of the U.S.S. Pueblo, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969) p. 12.

⁵Edward R. Murphy, Jr.; with Curt Gentry, Second in Command, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971) p. 5.

⁶Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970) p. 353.

⁷Bucher, p. 353.

⁸Bucher, p. 353.

⁹Armbrister, p. 137.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 148.

¹¹Ibid., p. 159.

¹²Murphy., p. 105.

¹³Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁶Frederick C. Schumacher, Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the U.S.S. Pueblo, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and

Jovanovich, 1970) p. 78.

¹⁷Murphy, p. 119.

¹⁸Schumacher, p. 7.

¹⁹Murphy, p. 399.

²⁰Ibid., p. 401.

²¹Armbrister, p. 388.

Chapter II: Risk Assessment

The risk assessment for the first mission of the Pueblo was considered "minimal". The risk assessment itself may be questioned, however, the purpose of this chapter is to study the procedure by which the assessment was made and determine if it was appropriate. If the procedure was appropriate then the risk assessment of "minimal" may need to be studied, however, if the procedure was inappropriate, this would make the overall value of the risk assessment questionable.

It is important to remember that risk assessment by itself is only one value among many which the decision makers must contend with in deciding whether a mission should be conducted. It would be presumptuous to assume that the higher the risk assessment the lower the chances that a mission would take place. Other values, such as the benefit of the information gained by the mission, might overrule the risk assessment by the decision maker.

The processes for assigning risk assessment, at the time of the Pueblo incident, were quite well defined by the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS). The process normally started by the 12th of the month preceding the actual mission. The 1967 JCS criteria for risk assessment is still classified and therefore will not be stated in the study.

The chain of command for reviewing and assigning a risk

assessment starts at the ship. However, since the crew of the ship had little contact with their Operational Commander, they were not instrumental in the process. The Operational Commander, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAP) acting as the Commander Task Force (CTF 96), was responsible for scheduling and proposing the mission, thus he was the first commander to assign a risk assessment. From COMNAVFORJAP the assessment was sent to the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and then to the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) who was the Unified Commander for the total Pacific Area. The two commands then reviewed the assessment and sent it forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington, D.C. JCS reviewed the assessment and incorporated it into a monthly reconnaissance schedule. After completing the reconnaissance schedule, it was then sent to the Senior Review Board.¹ Before the U.S. Congress Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo Hearing, General Wheeler implied that the members of the Senior Review Board partially consisted of representatives from the White House, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department and Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency). Since the complete list of board members is still classified, suffice to say that it consisted of high level national government officials who were to review all monthly reconnaissance schedules and had the power to delete or change any mission. If JCS disagreed with any of the Senior Review Board's actions they could question the decision of

the Board members and if necessary, advise the President of the United States. However, the JCS rarely did this because they were not privy to all of the Senior Review Board political considerations.

This system of reviews and checks was established by the JCS so that missions could be assessed against standardized criteria. COMNAVFORJAP, Rear Admiral Johnson and his staff were not aware of the JCS risk assessment criteria, so their assessment was based in the following considerations:

- a. The political climate
- b. Sensitivity of the target country
- c. Material condition of the ship
- d. Training level of the ship's personnel
- e. The climatological condition of the area of the patrol
- f. Nature and sensitivity of the operations
- g. Possibility of hostile reactions
- h. Forces available for the mission
- i. Previous experience in the proposed area of operations
- j. Difficulties of navigation in proposed area of operations
- k. Encounters with ships and aircraft (mutual interference to be expected)
- l. Anticipated intelligence take

- m. Support forces available
- n. Opposing forces

Because of its classification the JCS criteria cannot be listed here but, the House Subcommittee hearing report noted "the criteria established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for risk evaluation appears to differ significantly from that observed by Commander Naval Forces Japan".³ The Pueblo mission was among nine AGER patrols proposed to CINCPACFLT on 28 November 1967, for the period 1 January to 1 July 1968. Four missions were proposed for the USS Banner and five by the Pueblo. Each mission was supposed to be for a one month period.

On 14 December 1967, COMNAVFORJAP sent CINCPACFLT the formal proposal for the Pueblo's first mission, scheduled for January. It stated "Estimate of risk: minimal since Pueblo will be operating in international waters for the entire deployment".⁴ There was little explanation of how this assessment had been ascertained or if the assessment had been discussed with Commander Bucher or any of his staff. CINCPACFLT validated the risk assessment on 17 December. It was forwarded by message to CINCPAC, with an information copy sent to the JCS, using the following text: "B. Estimate of risk: minimal".⁵ CINCPAC's staff officers contacted CINCPACFLT and after validating the risk assessment sent the following message to the JCS: "risk to Pueblo is estimated to be minimal since operation will be

conducted in international waters".⁶ Again no detailed justification was given for making the assessment. However, Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC, had been briefed on the Pueblo mission and it appears that his staff had approximately four days to discuss the Pueblo mission in total. Admiral Sharp personally released the message to JCS on 22 December.

The JCS started the approval process when they received the CINCPACFLT information message on 17 December. It should be noted that CINCPAC could have modified or cancelled the mission, changing the whole procedure from that point.

The group that actually reviewed the mission for the JCS was the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) of the JCS. Commander Victor Wolke was the officer responsible for coordinating the Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule through the offices within Department of Defense (DOD) that might have some interest. He contacted the various services, National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and finally outside of DOD, the State Department's, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.⁷ The DIA representative that reviewed the mission was U.S. Army Major Donald Alexander, who dealt with the North Korean problem on a daily basis. It should be noted that he was also involved in many other projects and that the North Korean area only occupied part of his time.

The JCS members individually looked at the overall reconnaissance schedule. If any member had a question the

total group convened to work out any problems.

The JCS did not convene for the January 1968 Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule, because of the absence of the service chiefs during the Christmas holidays.⁸

On 29 December the Pueblo proposal, along with many other reconnaissance missions, was approved by the JCS, CIA, NSA, and State Department and forwarded to the Department of Defense (DOD). The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Nitze, quickly reviewed the document. Mr. Nitze stated later that "The proposals I paid attention to were the ones where there was a difference of opinion".⁹ The Pueblo mission was not one of them. The proposal was then inspected by the Senior Interdepartmental Group and approved, but since it was the Friday before the New Years weekend, the final approval message was not sent until the 2nd of January 1968.

While this procedure was taking place, the Deputy to the Assistant Director of Production at NSA, Mr. Efon, was concerned with the "minimal" risk assessment of the Pueblo mission, however, he understood that NSA was more concerned with the tasking of the Pueblo rather than the risk. On the 29th of December, the following message was sent from the Director NSA to the JCS/JRC, with an information copy to CINCPAC:

Paragraph 1. Reference states, "Risk to Pueblo is estimated to be minimal since operations will be conducted in international waters".

Paragraph 2. The following information is forwarded to aid in your assessment of CINCPAC's

estimate of risk. Deleted 1. The North Korean Air Force has been extremely sensitive to peripheral reconnaissance flights in this area since early 1965. (This sensitivity was emphasized on April 28, 1965, when a U.S. Air Force RB 47 was fired on and severely damaged 35 to 40 nautical miles from the Coast.)

2. The North Korean Air Force has assumed an additional role of naval support since late 1966.

3. The North Korean Navy reacts to any Republic of Korea Navy vessel or Republic of Korea fishing vessel near the North Korean coast line. (This was emphasized on January 10, 1967, when a Republic of Korea Naval vessel was sunk by coast artillery.)

4. Internationally recognized boundaries as they relate to airborne activities are generally not honored by North Korea on the East Coast of Korea. But there is no [deleted] evidence of provocative harassing activities by North Korean vessels beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast.

Paragraph 3. The above is provided to aid in evaluating the requirement for ship protective measures and is not intended to reflect adversely on CINCPACFLT deployment proposal.¹⁰

The sending of this was an extremely unusual event as NSA was not responsible for risk assessment. In sending the "Warning Message" Lieutenant General Carter, NSA Director, was stepping into DIA's area of responsibility. However, during the House of Representatives Subcommittee Hearings, Lieutenant General Carter was asked to address the reasons for his agency sending the "Warning Message". He replied in the following way:

General Carter. (one line deletion) This was the first voyage of the Pueblo, the very first one, and it was the first voyage in which we were having a vessel linger for a long period of time near North Korean waters. It therefore was a special mission as we saw it. We knew that she was going to stay in international water. We had no evidence that the North Koreans at sea had ever interfered with or had any intentions to interfere with a U.S. vessel outside of their acknowledged

territorial waters. Nevertheless, our people felt that even though all of this information was already available in intelligence community reports it would be helpful if we summed them up and gave them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for whatever use they might make of them or assistance in evaluating this particular mission.¹¹

The "Warning Message" was received at the Pentagon by the Defense Intelligence Agency Signal Office (DIASO) and was sent to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The watch officer that night, Commander Victor Wolke, decided to send the message to the JRC and to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Unfortunately, the copy to CNO was incorrectly given a prosign of "ZEN", meaning it had been delivered by other means. Therefore, although it was transmitted 29 December, CNO didn't received the "Warning Message" until after the Pueblo had been captured (23 January).

JRC Commander, General Steakley received the NSA message on 2 January. He had it retransmitted to CINCPAC for information. Neither DIA nor the SIG were informed of the message, because as General Steakley later stated, "I didn't specify the retransmittal (to any particular office there), (I) just sent it to CINCPAC, period. It gets to the right office. It wanders its way down".¹²

Since the message was cited "for information" CINCPAC Admiral Sharp did not see it. The message was handled by his staff and was filed, only to be retrieved during the House of Representatives investigation.

There is one other communicative path that is very

unclear about the "Warning Message". Captain Cook, Director Naval Security Group, Washington, D.C., received an unofficial copy of the NSA message and forwarded it by secure message channel to Captain E. Gladding, Director Naval Security Group Activities, Pacific. Captain Gladding stated after the Pueblo capture that he never received the secure message.¹³

It is rather obvious that the established criteria for assessing risk were not used by the COMNAVFORJAP nor did the members in the chain of command review the internal procedures by which the risk assessment was assigned.

Since the criteria that COMNAVFORJAP used was not consistent with the JCS standards, the validity of the risk assessment itself appears questionable. No matter what criteria were used, the justification and procedures for assigning a risk were not sent up the chain of command. Risk assessments may be signed by the Commanding Officer but they are developed by his/her staff. If a particular staff member at COMNAVFORJAP questioned the risk assessment of "minimal" on point A and this dissenting view was overruled by the Chief of Staff or the Commanding Officer, then the risk assessment was transmitted with no justifications. The next command might not be aware of point A at all. This miscoordination could happen at each level of the chain of command concerning various assessment factors, and could result in a misleading evaluation being forwarded up the chain of command. Another problem was that when a central

point of responsibility was designated for risk assessments, i.e. DIA, it was not well known throughout the system, e.g., Commander Wolke of the (NMCC) did not transmit the "NSA Warning Message" to DIA. There was no procedure for updating risk assessments by a command once it had been forwarded. Finally, both the JCS and COMNAVFORJAP made risk assessments based on assumptions that overlooked the possibility of certain events. For example both assumed that the Pueblo was going to be in international waters, because of the order to stay 13 nautical miles (NM) from any land mass. Considering its steering and other mechanical problems¹⁴ it was possible that the ship might be disabled and float within the 12 NM limit before help could arrive.

Analysis of the risk assessment procedure is necessary to identify changes that would make the system more reliable, valid and efficient.

The Rand Corporation in March 1971, wrote a case study of the Pueblo mission risk assessment for the Department of Defense. The study started by defining "risk" as the "likelihood that certain consequences" could happen, that is the likelihood of the ship's "capture, harassment, attack or nothing happening". The purpose for defining risk this way was to be able to quantify those events and then work them into models that would help indicate when an event might happen. This would have vastly improved the previous COMNAVFORJAP procedures. Since any mission not rated "minimal" was not conducted, the assessments were adjusted

to attain that level. The Rand Corporation tried to overcome this problem by quantifying the process so that there would be a numerical difference between missions. But the Rand processes were so difficult that the unit commanders and staffs in the field would have had great difficulty in understanding the figures.¹⁵ The study also attempted to define an event that could happen and attain a probability value for it happening if it were preceded by other events. This system became very subjective, in that someone in the process has to determine all the possible outcomes and develop all the possible solutions. This alone requires a lot of manpower and money and could still conceivably provide the decision maker with an inaccurate value. If the events are not totally exhaustive, one option is omitted from the model, or all possible paths leading to an event were not considered, the final outcome would be inaccurate.

To overcome these problems, this study suggests that it is not the final figure that is important, but the process by which the figure was developed. The commanding officers or staff in the assessment chain of command have to define "risk" on their own and then proceed to subjectively assess it. Risk on a collection platform such as the Pueblo can be broken into three general areas:

1. The possibility of the ship being damaged in some physical manner.
2. The possibility of the ship being harassed, but not

physically damaged by a foreign government's agents.

3. All other possibilities.

The first possibility should include the capture of the platform by a foreign government. It is assumed that to capture an American vessel, the ship would have to be physically damaged in some manner.¹⁶ The second possibility, "harassment", would be defined as "to be persistently disturbed". Finally, the third possibility would include all other events.

This list is designed to be workable and exhaustive, but yet to encompass and pinpoint the most threatening events that could occur for a collection platform. Bayesian analysis would then be used to evaluate the probability of each of these events happening and then the revised probability would be figured, after other known events that might influence the revised probability are included in the calculation.

The advantage of Bayesian analysis are:

1. It does not have a conservative or liberal bias, in that the analysts assign probabilities to individual events, not just to the hypothesis, therefore they would be unaware of how each event would effect the total probability.

2. Each intervening event or datum has to act on the total.

3. The analyst is forced into considering each event.

4. It helps to bring out differences between analysts, as they have to assign a probability to each event.

5. It forces the analyst to consider and define his/her hypothesis.

6. It is a deductive method, not inductive; i.e., the analyst considers the probability of an event happening, not the probability of the hypothesis happening.

In the Pueblo risk assessment, all of the above advantages would have helped provide a quantifiable value that would have meant something to the decision maker. However the most important value of this method is that no single event would get lost in the process, and that the next person in the chain of command could adjust the value if new information became available.

If this system were used, the following sequence of events for deciding on a risk assessment might have occurred with the Pueblo mission.

1. COMNAVFORJAP's staff in conjunction with the Pueblo staff would decide on the probability of the three hypotheses happening given they did not know of any other influencing events. Obviously they might be aware of previous events, however if the process had been occurring for a period this bias would be eliminated.

2. Next the most current list of events that might effect the mission would be drawn from current intelligence. In this particular case the following events had happened and COMNAVFORJAP was aware of them.¹⁷

A. The USS Banner had conducted two transits of the North Korean coast in 1967 and was not harassed.

B. In April 1965, a U.S. Air Force RB-47 was damaged by North Korean fire while conducting operations 35 to 40 NM off the nearest land mass.

C. There was an increase in border incidents by North Korean troops in 1967.

D. On 19 January 1967, a Republic of Korea naval vessel was sunk by North Korean coastal artillery.

E. In November 1967, the North Koreans "flushed" MIG-21 aircraft on a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft plane near Wonsan Harbor.

F. The North Koreans had consistently gone "on alert" when U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft veered close to their land mass.

3. A probability with a short justification would then be assigned to each event happening separately given each one of the hypotheses.

4. A revised hypothesis would be calculated.

5. All of these figures would be sent up the chain of command, for any additional information that would have to be added.

6. Finally, a central point of responsibility would be assigned for the risk assessment. DIA, and all other parties would be aware of their responsibilities, and commands would forward post-risk assessment data to DIA.

A hypothetical case is provided in Appendix F as a guide to explain the method described above. It is not meant to indicate that the actual Pueblo risk assessment was

incorrect; only to show how the system might have worked.

This procedure was designed to force the separate staffs to look at all available information, incorporating all opinions into the final assessment. By transmitting all the figures with justification up the chain of command, the next echelon would then know how the previous command attained its values and thus be able to revise the values if necessary. One point of responsibility would permit any additional information that might be necessary in considering the assessment to be easily handled, such as the NSA "Warning Message".

Finally, it is important that every command understand that the final value is not as important as the procedure used to attain it, and that the value may be used only with a great deal of caution.

NOTES

¹U.S. Congress, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) p. 885.

²U.S. Congress, p. 1651.

³Ibid, p. 1651.

⁴Ibid, p. 1650.

⁵Ibid, p. 1651.

⁶Ibid, p. 1651.

⁷Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: A True Story of the Pueblo Affair, (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970) p. 190.

⁸Armbrister, p. 194.

⁹Ibid, p. 194.

¹⁰U.S. Congress, p. 1654.

¹¹Ibid, p. 1654.

¹²Armbrister, p. 198.

¹³Ibid, p. 199.

¹⁴Frederick C. Schumacher, Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the U.S.S. Pueblo, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1970) p. 52.

¹⁵Ralph E. Strauch, The Operational Assessment of Risk: A Case Study of the Pueblo Mission, (Rand Corp., March 1971) p. 47.

¹⁶Ed Brandt, The Last Voyage of the U.S.S. Pueblo, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969) p. 234.

¹⁷Strauch, p. 17.

Chapter III: The Event

The major objective in studying the warning cycle in this instance is to link the risk assessment with the warnings that were given and determine if the warnings were properly considered. The easiest way of handling this question is to examine the events the risk assessment officers were not aware of and the events that took place from the time the risk assessment was assigned until the Pueblo was captured. The study will also consider how the commands handled reporting on the sequence of events, i.e., was pertinent information passed up the chain of command to the decision makers, and if so, what importance was placed on it? The importance is not so much what decisions were made from the warnings individually, but what the procedures were for the total system.

After the risk assessment was assigned but prior to the Pueblo setting sail from Japan on her mission, the following events took place (except for the first event, these took place after the risk assessment events considered on page 33).

1. (1967) The USS Banner, while on one its missions in the East China Sea, was being harassed by Soviet ships. One Soviet ship raised the "Heave to" flag. This alerted the Captain of the Banner, LCDR Charles Clark, who requested assistance from a U.S. destroyer that was providing indirect

support to the Banner. It took the U.S. destroyer 16 hours to arrive on the scene of the incident, at which time, the Soviet ships quickly left the area.¹

2. (1967) North Korean leaders made statements that "the U.S. must be diverted from its efforts in Vietnam by being forced into an international crisis elsewhere".²

3. (December 1967) North Korean Major General Pak Chung Kuk was complaining to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjon about "some alleged violation of his country's territorial waters".³

4. (6 January 1968) Radio Pyongyang broadcast the following statement: "The U.S. Imperialist aggressor army, which has been incessantly committing provocative acts lately on the sea of the eastern coast, from 0600 hours this morning again dispatched many armed boats, mingled with fishing boats, under the escort of armed warships into the coastal waters of our side...to perpetrate provocative acts..."⁴

5. (11 January 1968) Radio Pyongyang broadcast the following statement: "The U.S. Imperialist aggressor troops dispatched early this morning hundreds of fishing boats and spy boats disguised as fishing boats into coastal waters of our side off the eastern coast...As long as the U.S. Imperialist aggressor troops conduct reconnaissance by sending spy boats, our naval ships will continue to take determined counter-measures".⁵

The first event is considered because the impact was

different than during the assignment of the risk assessment process. This event is important not only because it was used as a justification by the COMNAVFORJAP that the Pueblo might be harassed, but because Commander Bucher was aware of the incidents. Further into the warning cycle, this event will have an effect on Commander Bucher's actions.

The second event is important because it has been considered a motivation for the North Korean attack upon the Pueblo. President Johnson stated in his memoirs, "The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese had inaugurated a siege of our Marine Base at Khe Sanh on January 21 and we know that the enemy was preparing to launch a full-scale offensive throughout South Vietnam in a desperate last-ditch effort to turn the tide of the war".⁶ The President was convinced that if the U.S. knew of the upcoming North Vietnamese operation, certainly the North Koreans were aware of it. He connected the Tet Offensive and the Pueblo Crisis because the Tet Offensive happened eight days after the Pueblo incident which caused the U.S. to divert forces and equipment to the Korean operations area.⁷ Ammunition stocks in South Korea before the Pueblo incident had been depleted to a low level, therefore, after the incident they had to be raised to normal levels so that if an American operation took place it would be satisfactorily supplied. Another example was the activation of reserve troops in the U.S., and the South Koreans considering a recall of two divisions from South Vietnam.⁸ President Johnson was convinced that

the Pueblo incident was planned by the North Koreans in support of the North Vietnam offensive and that the Soviet Union leaders were also aware of the diversion. He stated:

"There was another reason that persuaded us that the seizure was not an impulsive act. As soon as I learned that the Pueblo had been seized, I instructed Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow to ask Soviet officials for assistance in obtaining the release of the ship and the crew. Ambassador Thompson received the Soviet reply almost immediately, a very negative and chilly response. The Soviets could scarcely have obtained the necessary information regarding the incident from the North Koreans, conferred about it, and taken a position so quickly without prior information.

We believed that the capture of the Pueblo was premeditated."⁹

The statements of President Johnson were obviously given after the fact. The importance of the North Korean statement is that it was intercepted by U.S. Embassy personnel in Seoul Korea and was analyzed by its personnel and analysts at the State Department. Neither group of analysts considered the statements as important in themselves, thus they forwarded the information as routine information reports.

The third event was analyzed by Rear Admiral John Victor Smith as "The usual Communist Garbage".¹⁰ Rear Admiral Smith was an Annapolis graduate, son of Marine Corps General "Howling Mad" Smith, and had been the Senior Negotiator for the United Nations Command for approximately three months. He felt that due to the extremely sensitive nature of his post that the North Koreans might hold him

hostage, therefore he excluded himself from classified materials. For this reason, he was not privy to the Pueblo's mission. He also viewed the warning as noise (propaganda to disguise the truth) and did not pass the information/warning up the intelligence chain of command.

The fourth and fifth warnings given by the North Korean government, were analyzed and reviewed by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, South Korea. The Embassy analyst, Mr. Richard A. Erickson, quickly read through the two radio broadcasts and disregarded them as propaganda. However, he did pass them on to the State Department in Washington and to COMNAVFORJAP. COMNAVFORJAP however, only received the 6 January radio message. The intelligence officers at COMNAVFORJAP also viewed the message as "sheer propaganda" and did not relate it to future intelligence operations off the North Korean coast. The State Department "country director" for South Korea, Mr. Benjamin A. Fleck, agreed with COMNAVFORJAP and Mr. Erickson. He, too, paid very little attention to the warning.

Appendix G clearly shows the warning/events that happened after the risk assessment and before the Pueblo set sail were not consistently passed to a coordinating center. This fact represents the most serious problem with the warning cycle. The lack of a single point of contact for a mission, can result in misrouting of both information and warnings vital to the operation.

Since these events occurred before the Pueblo set sail

it would have been possible, with a coordination center at DIA, to have incorporated them in formulating the risk assessment probability of Appendix F. Appendix H provides an example of how these events could have figured into the risk assessment probability. The final figure is not as important as the rigid analysis required by the procedure.

After the Pueblo set sail the following additional events/warnings took place:

6. There was increased air activity in the Wonsan Harbor by North Korean aircraft.

7. This paragraph deleted.

8. There was a series of border penetrations by North Korean infiltrators. These penetrations were culminated by the "Blue House Raid," (South Korean President's House) on 21 January 1968. The North Koreans had trained approximately 31 North Korean Army Lieutenants for the specific purpose of assassinating South Korean President

Park Chung Hee. Dressed in South Korean Army uniforms/fatigues, armed with 9 inch daggers, submachine guns and grenades, the officers were led by Lieutenant Kim Shin-jo across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). They were first seen six miles south of the DMZ. On 21 January, the National Police killed most of the attackers while the rest escaped to the mountains. The North Korean infiltrators had managed to get within 1000 yards of the Blue House. Mr. Erickson, an analyst at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, quickly realized that President Park and his cabinet would retaliate against North Korea. This fact becomes important when the U.S. considers its retaliatory actions against the North Korean government for the Pueblo incident.¹²

9. Between 19 and 21 January, the North Koreans had locked a fire control radar on the Pueblo.¹³ At dusk on 21 January a North Korean Subchaser 501 (SO-1) was spotted by the crew of the Pueblo. Photographers Mate Mack came to the bridge of the Pueblo and took pictures of the vessel. Since it was dusk the SO-1 was hard to see. She sailed, however, past the Pueblo at approximately 500 yards off her port bow. LT Harris was able to make a positive identification of the ship. This was the first military vessel that the Pueblo crew had seen.¹⁴

10. On the morning of 22 January, LT Steve Harris reported to Commander Bucher that his Detachment was "finally getting some interesting signals".¹⁵

11. At 1225 local time on the 22nd of January, Warrant

Officer Gene H. Lacy spotted two North Korean fishing vessels (Soviet Union-type trawlers) approximately eight nautical miles from the Pueblo. The ships closed on the Pueblo, and circled her twice within 500 yards. They then proceeded north. Commander Bucher had ordered the Pueblo crew out of sight and LTJG S. Schumacher was ordered to prepare a Situation Report (SITREP) to inform COMNAVFORJAP of the incident. While this was happening, the two North Korean fishing vessels turned around and headed straight toward the Pueblo. This time, the Pueblo took pictures of the ships and identified them as Rice Paddy I and Rice Paddy II.¹⁶ The North Koreans in turn were taking pictures of the Pueblo.¹⁷

12. At 1645 (4:45 pm) the Captain released the SITREP message. However, the communication links were not working and it was not until the next morning that the message was actually received by COMNAVFORJAP. This communications breakdown was attributed to "atmospheric oddities" vice equipment failure.¹⁸

13. On the evening of 22 January, the Pueblo's crew spotted 18 separate ship contacts. One bright orange flare was shot up over some fishing vessels in the Wonsan Harbor.¹⁹

Event eight was analyzed by the personnel at COMNAVFORJAP by Captain Thomas L. Dwyer, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Lieutenant Ed Brooke. They considered telling Commander Bucher to abort his mission, but because reports on this story were still sketchy, they decided to inform Rear Admiral Johnson instead. The Admiral decided that there was not enough evidence to abort the Pueblo mission. Although LT Brooke and CAPT Dwyer reasoned that Commander Bucher needed to be told of the situation, they felt the Pueblo would find out via the fleet broadcast. However LT Harris, on the Pueblo, was receiving the fleet broadcast 24 hours a day, and therefore read only what he thought was the most important traffic, addressed directly to the Pueblo as 467Y. The Blue House raid message was not one of the 467Y messages, so he did not read it. Finally, the Communications Technicians in the Naval Security Group Detachment,²¹ on the Pueblo, were listening to commercial radio (which was against work procedures) and had heard a news broadcast on the Blue House raid but felt that they might get into trouble if they informed LT Harris. LT Harris was not given the warning from the CT's and had not received the warning from COMNAVFORJAP.

Commander Bucher was aware of the events in number nine but he did not pass the information to Rear Admiral Johnson. The warning was not passed to the decision maker, therefore he was unable to incorporate it with the other events.

The added increase in radio traffic and electronic

emissions, in event ten, was not viewed as an indicator or preparation for action. Ironically Commander Bucher and LT Harris were pleased with the activity increase, and therefore, were not in the least bit concerned about this indication of preparations.²²

Events eleven and twelve are interrelated and show that Commander Bucher was aware of the indicator. In transmitting the information to Rear Admiral Johnson, Commander Bucher informed the decision maker, however, neither was considered an unusual event.

The final event, thirteen, is a clear indicator that the North Koreans were preparing for action in the Wonsan Harbor area. This indicator was forwarded to COMNAVFORJAP, but communications problems delayed its receipt until the next day.

These events and actions show that even if the warnings were taken as signals and not noise (deception), they were not coordinated through one single office. The second portion of Appendix G shows the offices that received the nine events.

The events that happened on the 23rd of January 1968, were multiple and interrelated, therefore, the events will be identified by both Zulu (Z) (Greenwich mean) and Local Wonsan area time. The significance of the events will be clarified and addressed after the chronological listing of the events. The following is a list of events from 0300 (Z)/1200 local time on the 23rd.

14. 0300/1200--The Pueblo sights a North Korean SO-1 Subchaser. This particular ship was number 35, armed with a 57 millimeter cannon forward of the bridge, another cannon aft, and several machine guns around her bridge.²³ North Korean SO-1 Subchasers are Russian-built, modified by Korea, with a length of 130 feet overall by 21 feet beam. Her top speed was 25 knots in sea-state two, considerably faster than the Pueblo. While Commander Bucher and LT Harris identified the warship, her crew was at General Quarters and her guns were pointed right at the Pueblo. Commander Bucher was asked by Warrant Officer Lacy if he wanted the ship to go to General Quarters, but the Commander did not want to alarm the North Koreans. He decided to wait, and made most of the crew stay out of sight.²⁴

15. 0305/1205--Commander Bucher ordered the ship's location to be checked. LT Murphy lit up the Radar system and fixed the ship at 15.8 NM from the closest land mass, Ung-do Island.²⁵ This position was also checked by Loran readings, fathometer and other classified sources, therefore, a House Subcommittee investigation would conclude: "The data, obtained from classified sources, does eliminate any possible doubt concerning the ship's location".²⁶

16. 0314/1214--The Pueblo hoisted her national ensign.²⁷ The North Korean SO-1 hoisted her signal flag to "Heave to or I will open fire".²⁸ Commander Bucher had LT Murphy check the international flag signals. His check

quickly found the meaning "to bring the vessel to a standstill."²⁹ This was very confusing to the Pueblo's officers since the ship was already "dead in the water." Commander Bucher decided at this time to send a message to Kamiseya, Japan (a Naval Security Group Activity) for COMNAVFORJAP that his ship was being harassed. The ship's communications section had opened an operational communications circuit and was transmitting to maintain an open line.

17. 0315/1215--Three North Korean, Soviet-designed P-4 torpedo boats closed fast on the Pueblo. The boats' crews were at General Quarters, manning 14.5 millimeter machine guns and AK-47 automatic rifles.³⁰ The boats' top speed was 50 knots vs. the Pueblo's 12.2 knots.

18. 0320/1220--The Pueblo signals the North Korean SO-1 that "I am in international waters" and "Intend to remain in the area until tomorrow."³¹

19. 0350/1250--Pinnacle Number I, a high priority message, was sent by Commander Bucher to Kamiseya, Japn for COMNAVFORJAP that the ship was being harassed. Shortly thereafter, LT Harris and LTJG Schumacher explained that the ship could send a high priority "flash critic message." There is some confusion as to whether the Pinnacle Number I was then sent as a "Critic" or if Kamiseya retransmitted the Pinnacle Number I as a "Critic."^{32,33}

20. 0414/1315--A fourth North Korean P-4 arrives on the scene with two Russian-made MIG-21s. At this point, one

of the MIGs fired a rocket a great distance beyond the Pueblo.³⁴ The Pueblo crew was still not at General Quarters, therefore, neither of the two .50 caliber machine guns were manned nor had the submachine guns been issued.

21. 0416/1316--The North Korean SO-1 raised a new signal flag, "Follow in my wake; I have a pilot abroad." Commander Bucher ordered preparation for emergency destruction and to have the Pueblo sail ahead one-third speed away from the land mass. He also answered the flags with his own "Thank you for your consideration. I am departing the area."³⁵

22. 0418/1318--Pinnacle II or Critic was sent to Kamiseya Japan.

23. 0419/1319--The four P-4s were crisscrossing 20 yards in front of the Pueblo.

24. 0425/1325--A 57 millimeter salvo round from the SO-1 slammed into the side of the Pueblo. The second salvo hit near the pilot house of the Pueblo, causing the windows to shatter.

25. 0426/1326--Commander Bucher issued the emergency destruction order.³⁶ Commander Bucher also considered putting his crew at General Quarters but felt that the Pueblo's two .50 caliber machine guns were futile against the North Koreans. Someone would have to run 30 yards in an open, totally exposed area underfire, to man the gun.³⁷ He decided to go to the modified General Quarters, which meant most of the crew would stay below deck, only essential personnel

would be exposed to North Korean fire.

26. 0430/1330--A second North Korean SO-1 arrives.

27. 0430/1330--Commander Bucher, believing that the Pueblo was going to be captured, felt the best thing to do was to "stall as long as we could so as to complete emergency destruction."³⁸ Since the ship was in shallow water, scuttling the ship (sinking it) was rejected. The emergency measures included burning documents and sledgehammering electronic equipment. The Crypto-Linguists were pulled from their intercept positions to assist in destroying gear, as their proficiency in Korean was not sufficient to interpret the North Korean communications.³⁹

28. 0431/1331--The Pueblo followed the North Korean vessel toward Wonsan Harbor. The North Koreans fired a third 57 millimeter salvo at the Pueblo to "speed up". Fireman Duane Hodges was mortally injured by this round. Commander Bucher still hoped at this point, that Rear Admiral Johnson would send Fifth Air Force assets.

29. 0432/1332--The last message was sent from the Pueblo, "Have been directed to come to all-stop and being boarded at this time. Four men injured, one critically. Going off the air now and destroying the gear."⁴⁰

30. 0437/1337--The Pueblo comes to a full stop and the North Koreans boarded the ship.

31. 0745/1645--The Pueblo, being sailed by the North Koreans, crossed the three mile territorial water limit.

Appendix G shows that the most significant events were passed up the chain of command. This chapter will not discuss the communications problems in the warning cycle, as they will be evaluated in the next chapter.

The main point to understand concerning events 14 through 31 is that Commander Bucher misperceived the intentions of the North Koreans. Why this was possible is clear when one examines Commander Bucher's background. He was aware of the Banner missions in the East China Sea and had been told many times by Commander "Chuck" Clark (CO of the Banner) of the severe harassment that his ship experienced from both the "Red" Chinese and Soviets. Commander Bucher discusses his intentions in case of harassment in Bucher: My Story:

Chuck confirmed the fact that on the one occasion he had passed along it, he had encountered no hostile reactions at all off the North Korean coast. Near the Soviet and Red China territorial waters (he never intruded) they invariably sent out shadowing units, either armed auxiliaries or destroyers, which did not hesitate to intimidate him with maneuvers which threatened collision and signals which included HEAVE TO OR I WILL FIRE, backed up by guns manned and ready to shoot. In each case, his only defense had been to stick as closely as possible to the rules of the road as they apply to International Waters and proceed on his course and business according to his orders: In each case, the hostile forces had stopped their harassment just short of outright attack. It was nerve-wracking, but I decided that with the detailed experience he was passing on to me, I could steel myself play the same game of Chicken.⁴¹

He had also been reassured by Lieutenant Commander Clark that if support was needed, it would be provided

within one hour by aircraft support or 24 hours by ship support.⁴²

This assurance of assistance was also relayed to Commander Bucher by the CINCPAC staff.⁴³ At COMNAVFORJAP, he was informed that in the unlikely chance of trouble, support would be provided.

LT Murphy, in Second in Command, stated:

"What help can we expect if we get into trouble?" Bucher asked the briefing officers.

There was an "on-call" support arrangement with Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, they assured him. However, much less reassuringly, they added that due to the Status of Forces agreement with Japan, no aircraft could be launched from there. There were jets in South Korea and on Okinawa, but since this particular mission's risk was evaluated as minimal, they wouldn't be placed on strip alert. Nor would there be any large U.S. ships in the immediate vicinity. In short, if we got into serious trouble and needed help it would be sent, but it could take some time."⁴⁴

Commander Bucher felt, during the events leading up to the capture, that the North Koreans meant only to harass his ship and that flaghoists, the assault, and even to some degree the boarding, were all part of this campaign. He believed the North Koreans had no intention of seizing the Pueblo. The radio operator at Kamiseya, Japan, also thought these actions were nothing more than harassment. Because Commander Bucher understood the capabilities of the SO-1s, P-4s and MIG-21s, he felt helpless but was sure that U.S. fire power was on the way. To help explain this portion of the warning cycle, it is necessary to classify the

events/warning.

The non-action North Korean warnings may be considered political, and the warnings up to the point of the North Korean S0-1 flying the "Heave to" flag as strategic. The warnings do not fit into readily-definable, labeled, categories: the Pueblo incident was extremely complex and interrelated with other events.

No indicator list was set up for the Pueblo mission; however, if one had been created, the sources for discerning indicators should have been:

1. North Korean doctrine
2. North Korean capabilities
3. North Korean intentions.
4. Steps to a state of readiness
5. Previous crisis
6. U.S. analogues
7. Hunches
8. Continuity

The indications were all there. In retrospect, however, an indicator list was not created and indications were not put together in one clear logical order.

The indicator list could have also been used to set up a list of probable significant events on the Pueblo mission. Appendix I is an attempt to create a probability diagram

using probable events. The actual figures are not important; the importance is found in the procedure that is being explained by the Appendix. The following probable events could have been used:

1. The North Koreans identify the Pueblo, determined by the Pueblo's Commanding Officer.
2. The North Koreans bring military vessels within 1000 meters of the ship.
3. The North Koreans show fire-power either visually or by firing off a demonstration round.

The purpose of the probability diagram would be to mathematically assess the probability of certain events happening if other events had already happened. This could be completed before the ship set sail and used as a decision maker's tool by Commander Bucher while on the mission. Probability diagrams are a straight forward method of breaking the problem into its component parts, and assessing those probabilities. "Instead of trying to assess the overall likelihood of an occurrence, probability diagrams permit the analyst to assess its likelihood by first assuming that some preliminary events have occurred, then by assuming they have not."⁴⁵

The Operations Officer (acting as the Intelligence Officer at COMNAVFORJAP) would be asked to fill in the probabilities. The events are dependent in sequence from

left to right.

Using the probability diagram in Appendix I, the following information can be determined:

1. Prior to the mission there was a
 - A. .09696 probability of H_1 happening
(ship damaged).
 - B. .52160 probability of H_2 happening
(ship harassed).
 - C. .35118 probability of H_3 happening
(all other possibilities).

The total probabilities come to .96974 instead of 1.0 due to rounding the numbers off.

2. After the ship was identified there was a
 - A. .159 probability of H_1 happening.
 - B. .617 probability of H_2 happening.
 - C. .194 probability of H_3 happening.

See Appendix J

3. After the ship was identified and the North Korean vessels were within 1000 meters of the Pueblo, there was a

- A. .205 probability of H_1 happening.
- B. .745 probability of H_2 happening.
- C. .050 probability of H_3 happening.

See Appendix K

4. After the ship was identified, the North Korean vessels were within 1000 meters of the Pueblo and the North Koreans had fired there was a

- A. .45 probability of H_1 happening.
- B. .50 probability of H_2 happening.
- C. .05 probability of H_3 happening.

See Appendix L

COMNAVFORJAP did not have a procedure that would have given Commander Bucher general guidance on what he should expect. The importance of this was that if COMNAVFORJAP had created a probability diagram before the Pueblo set sail, Commander Bucher could have had general guidance on what to do if each event happened.

The purpose of this exercise is not to point to the probabilities and conclude that Commander Bucher's actions were improper, but to show one possible way that COMNAVFORJAP could have assisted Commander Bucher.

Commander Bucher, both during the actual incident, and before he left Yokosuka, was not given any guidance as to what to do during a crisis situation. He acted on his judgement and personal biases to distinguish between noise, signals and determine what to do.

Since COMNAVFORJAP and the other commands in the chain had not assessed the probabilities of certain events, they had to decide quickly at the time of the crisis what action to take and then pass it to the Pueblo. In the next

chapter, this problem of timeliness and communicating responses will be discussed in length.

NOTES

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²U.S. News and World Report, January 26, 1981, p. 57.

³Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: A True Story of the Pueblo Affair, (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970) p. 27.

⁴Armbrister, p. 27.

⁵Ibid, p. 27.

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⁷Edwin B. Hooper, Mobility, Support Endurance: A Story of naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965-1968, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Officer, 1972) p. 253.

⁸Johnson, p. 535.

⁹ibid, p. 535.

¹⁰Arbrister, p. 28.

¹¹Ibid, p. 28.

¹²Ibid, p. 31.

¹³Edward R. Murphy, Jr.; with Curt Gentry, Second in Command, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971) p. 116.

¹⁴Murphy, p. 116.

¹⁵Lloyd M. Buchher, Bucher: My Story, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970) p. 168.

¹⁶Bucher, p. 170.

¹⁷Murphy, p. 119.

¹⁸Frederick C. Schumacher, Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the U.S.S. Pueblo, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanvich, 1970) pp. 78-80.

¹⁹Armbrister, p. 37.

²⁰Not used.

²¹Armbrister, p. 34.

²²Bucher, p. 168.

²³Schumacher, p. 84.

²⁴Bucher, p. 178.

²⁵Schumacher, p. 85.

²⁶U.S. Congress, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) p. 1661.

²⁷Murphy, p. 126.

²⁸Murphy, p. 127.

²⁹Ibid., p. 127.

³⁰Schumacher, p. 87.

³¹Murphy, p. 128.

³²Bucher, p. 181.

³³Schumacher, p. 87.

³⁴Ibid, p. 87.

³⁵Ibid, p. 89.

³⁶Bucher, p. 187.

³⁷Ibid, p. 188.

³⁸Ibid, p. 194.

³⁹Ibid, p. 196.

⁴⁰Stephen R. Harris, My Anchor Held, (Old Tappan, New Jersey: F.H. Revell Co., 1970) p. 11.

⁴¹Bucher, p. 130.

⁴²Ibid, p. 130.

⁴³Ibid, p. 111.

⁴⁴Murphy, p. 95.

⁴⁵OCI Notes on Methodology, Newsletter No. 8, 1 October 1973.

Chapter IV: Communications

In the previous chapter, the warning cycle was discussed in detail, however, the communication messages and transmissions were only superficially studied. Communications problems can normally be divided into two areas: equipment and procedures. In the Pueblo crisis, communications equipment was not a significant problem. The Special Subcommittee on the Pueblo crisis for the House of Representatives stated:

The technical ability of military units involved in both the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 incidents to transmit messages to other commands appeared, for the most part, to have been satisfactory. However, the advantages of speedy, modern, and sophisticated communications equipment were often more than offset by the indecisive and inefficient handling of these communications by the various commands involved.

To understand the procedural successes and shortfalls, it is necessary to outline the messages that were transmitted from the Pueblo. Appendix M is a list of all messages and texts issued by the Pueblo on 22 and 23 January 1968. For clarity a restatement of the most important messages will be presented.

On 22 January, the Pueblo broke radio silence and contacted the Naval Communication Station at Kamiseya, Japan, a few kilometers from COMNAVFORJAP. The personnel at Kamiseya had no authority to act on any of the operational

messages, they acted only as a go-between in the communication system. The first communications by the Pueblo were on a hard keyed frequency which was quite similar to a party line. For this reason Kamiseya attempted to communicate with the Pueblo using a high-speed teletype printer circuit. But the Pueblo was having static problems. They had tried six of their thirteen frequencies, and were unable to explain the problem.² This communication net was not successfully opened until 14 hours later, at 1100 local time on the 23rd of January.³ This was attributed to abnormal atmospheric conditions. From 1100 local until 1435 this high speed circuit remained open. From 1100 until 1250, the Pueblo sent routine message traffic, and 2 SITREP's. SITREP I was noted by the watch officer at CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAP), but no action was taken. SITREP II was sent at a priority precedence to CTF 96; again no action was necessary or taken.

Pinnacle/OPREP (Joint Operation Report) I was transmitted at 1250 local/0350 Zulu, Appendix N shows the addressees, time of receipt and delay time from the Pueblo. The term "Pinnacle" identifies a message as one of special interest to the JCS, National Military Command Center, at the Pentagon, and the White House. It was sent at a "flash" precedence and therefore could only be interrupted by a Critic "Flash override" message.⁴ Commander Bucher, at this point, was briefed by LT Harris and LTJG Schumacher about the ship's capability of sending a "Flash override Critic"

message. It should be noted that Commander Bucher was not prebriefed on Critic capability, as evidenced by his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry after the fact:

Q. (C) Commander, what is your understanding of a Critic message?

A. (C) Well sir, until this particular day, I had not been familiar with the term Critic. All I was familiar with was the highest priority Flash. Lieutenant Harris at some point came to the bridge together with Lieutenant Schumacher and explained to me that they recommended that the precedence Critic be assigned to the message in order that it would get the highest possible priority. I agreed with their recommendation, and allowed this precedence to be assigned. This was my first experience with it, in fact, I had never heard of Critic before that moment.

Q. (C) Well then, was it your understanding at that time, that your Pinnacle One went as a Critic message?

A. (A) I don't remember Captain, if it was Critic One or Critic Two, but one or both of them went as Critic.

As stated in Chapter 3, the priority of Pinnacle I the from Pueblo, either "Flash" or "Flash override" is still questionable, however, from Kamiseya, Japan, the message was retransmitted as a Critic. The basic text of the message was that the North Koreans had signaled to "Heave to or I will fire".

Approximately 27 minutes after OPREP 3/Pinnacle 1, OPREP 3/Pinnacle 2 was transmitted by the Pueblo. Again, the priority put on the message is very questionable. Appendix O shows the transmission times and receipts times for Pinnacle 2. Pinnacle 2 basically continued to update

the chain of command about the events happening on the Pueblo, i.e., "501 joined by three P-4 patrol craft number 601, 604, and 606. 501 has sent international code translated 'Follow in my wake...'. Two MIGs sighted on starboard bow circling; 604 is backing toward bow with fenders rigged with an armed landing party on board..."⁶ Pinnacle 2 was interrupted by operator chatter which indicated serious trouble to Lieutenant Commander Carl L. Hokenson, Jr., Commander Charles G. Schoenherr and Captain Pease (Chief of Staff) at COMNAVFORJAP. This was the triggering message for COMNAVFORJAP. Captain Pease contacted Rear Admiral Johnson, at the Sanno Hotel, in Tokyo, and had Captain Everett contact the Fifth Air Force at 1329 to "Push the contingency Button"⁷ But because Captain Everett had never practiced a secure line call to Fifth Air Force, he did not set a priority to the call, causing a 24 minute delay. Captain Everett later stated:

In order to speak over a secure phone both parties must "synchronize" at the same time, must read from a sequence of numbers on authentication cards. The process should require no more than five or ten minutes. But if one party is using the wrong codes, reading the wrong numbers, it can take forever, and this was what was happening now. Over and over Wilson said, "Count ten and go secure on my count..."⁸

Further, the Fifth Air Force did not have a Pueblo contingency plan, and since the ship's risk assessment was minimal, no planes had been put on strip alert. Moreover, Major Raymond A. Priest, Jr., assistant operations officer

at Fifth Air Force, a former exercise director in South Korea, had little knowledge of the Pueblo, therefore he decided the call must be a mock crisis. The Air Force had been regularly testing crisis reactions, so it made sense. However, at 1358, he was informed by Commander Thomas E. McDonald, the Navy's liaison officer at Fifth Air Force that the Pueblo truly was in trouble.

At the same time that the COMNAVFORJAP and Fifth Air Force staffs were reacting to the crisis, Kamiseya was retransmitting the Pueblo messages as Critics. Unfortunately, Captain J.W. Pearson had his personnel readdress Pinnacle II two minutes before Pinnacle I. This later created some confusion among the Washington, D.C. commands.⁹

Meanwhile, the Pentagon had just gone through a very long day. The Air Force had lost four H-bombs off the coast of Greenland. The U.S. Command in Saigon had inadvertently sent troops into Cambodia and the Marines at Khe Sanh were preparing to defend against a major North Vietnam offensive.

Just before midnight on 23 January, the first Critic message arrived at the Defense Intelligence Agency Signal Office (DIASO), and was relayed to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Within minutes Brigadier General Ralph Steakley, Chief of Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC), Vice Admiral Nels Johnson, Director of the Joint Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman JCS and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara were informed of the crisis.

At the State Department, Richard W. Finch, the Watch Officer, and Commander Richard Thomas, the military liaison officer, were confronted with the first critic. For clarification, they called the NMCC, but could only determine that the Pueblo was in trouble. Mr. Finch also immediately contacted the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the Under Secretary, Nicholas deB Katzenbach.

At the White House Situation Room the Watch Officer, Andrew Denner, received the critic message but could not identify the Pueblo. Therefore, he called the NMCC which was just as confused. He then informed the Director of the Situation Room, Arthur McCufferty, the President's Press Secretary, George Christian, and the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow.

Other units which also received the Critic Messages were NSA, CINCPAC, Commander Seventh Fleet, the USS Enterprise.

The USS Enterprise, at this time, was 510 miles south of the Wonsan area. When the Critic arrived, Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes, Jr. Commander Carrier Division One and Task Force 71 was receiving his daily flight operations briefing about Vietnam. At 1430 local time, the Admiral was shown Pinnacle I and nine minutes later Pinnacle II.¹⁰ Unaware of the Pueblo mission or what type of ship it was, he had his staff research the ship's publications for information.

At this point, all of the necessary action officers up the chain of command had been informed of the crisis. Thus,

the next action was to decide who had assets with which to react, and then to decide on a plan of action.

At the time of Pinnacle I and II, the following forces were available. Six ships were available, the USS Enterprise and one destroyer approximately 500 miles south of Wonsan harbor, another destroyer located 120 miles south of Yokosuka, Japan, and three destroyers in port at Yokosuka.¹¹ But, the fastest naval support would have taken a minimum of 20 hours to arrive on scene. The air power available included:

1. Fifth Air Force aircraft in South Korea; however, they were configured with nonconventional weapons and could not be used. The Fifth Air Force Commander informed Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force that he "had no gun pods, mers, pylons, or rails, with which to arm the F-4s (in South Korea), and that other support aircraft could not reach the scene before dark". He considered it very dangerous to send F-4s without air-to-air weapons since there were MIGs in the area.

2. Sixteen attack aircraft in Japan; there were eleven F-4s at Misawa and five F-105s at Yokota. These planes were not considered "available" due to the political restrictions placed on the field commanders. Even though this restriction may not have technically applied in this case, the field commanders thought that it did, therefore, they did not consider using them.

3. The U.S. Marine Corps had eight aircraft in Iwakuni, Japan. These planes were not considered for the same reasons as cited in paragraph 2.

4. Eighteen attack aircraft in Okinawa. (At this time Okinawa was not legally part of Japan, therefore, the political restrictions did not pertain)

5. Fifty-nine strike aircraft on board the USS Enterprise (CVAN 65). Due to corrosion caused by a recent storm only 35 aircraft were operationally ready; 10 F4Bs, 19 A4Es and 12 A6As.¹²

Rear Admiral Johnson had contacted General McKee (Commanding General Fifth Air Force) and requested assistance at 1400 local time. Lieutenant General McKee's staff considered all available assets, including those in South Korea. They concluded that the planes in Japan could not be used. The aircraft in South Korea were not likely to accomplish anything positive against MIG-21s.

Of all the assets available, the only planes that were actually launched were two F-105s from Okinawa.

To be successful, the planes would have had to reach the Pueblo by 0745Z/1645 (local) since that was when the ship would cross the North Korean three mile territorial limit, or at the latest 1741 local, sunset.¹³ For close air support to be effective it was necessary for the operation to take place in daylight.

The planes took off from Okinawa at 1611 local. Lieutenant General McKee instructed the planes to fly to

South Korea and wait for further orders. They arrived in Korea at 1735 local, which was obviously too late to be of any practical use.¹⁴

The other major asset in the Western Pacific was the Seventh Fleet. Rear Admiral Johnson did not directly contact Admiral Epes on board the Enterprise after becoming aware of the Pueblo crisis at 1430 Korean time.

The Pueblo crossed the three mile North Korean territorial water limit at 1645 local, therefore the Enterprise would have had to launch planes at 1515 local to be effective. Since Admiral Epes received Pinnacle I at 1430 local that gave him 45 minutes to receive orders and act, as appropriate. He decided not to act since, as he later stated, "What can I do for a ship that's already in the hands of another country and inside of its territorial waters? What risk would I be putting my air wing in to go to a place of overwhelming odds--the possibility of starting another Korean War?"¹⁵ Later, the Commander Seventh Fleet directed via message that "No Task Group 77.5 ship or aircraft take any overt action until further informed".¹⁶ Instead of launching planes, Admiral Epes diverted Task Force 77.5 to proceed toward the South Korean land mass. The only action taken by the Enterprise was at 2334 local time when the Commander Seventh Fleet directed the Enterprise to conduct photo reconnaissance operations off Wonsan. Appendix P gives the Enterprise's location.

The next major action that was taken was that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff ordered the Commander in Chief Pacific to permit no units to proceed further north than latitude 35°30' north.

At this point, 24 January, the President was faced with considering all of his alternatives and selecting the one most appropriate. The following alternatives were forwarded to President Johnson for consideration.

1. The U.S. Air Force or Navy could bomb the Pueblo.
2. U.S. forces could raid Wonsan or Pyongyang, or one of North Korea's major military installations.
3. The U.S. Navy could shell Wonsan, but stay outside the 12 mile limit.
4. The South Koreans might be encouraged to attack across the DMZ with a battalion size raid.
5. The USS Banner could be placed off Wonsan, with a Destroyer escort.
6. The U.S. could send in divers to salvage the ship.
7. Blockading all of North Korea.
8. The U.S. could send fighter planes to "spook" the North Koreans into action.¹⁷

On 25 January, the North Koreans conducted a raid along the DMZ, and several U.S. soldiers were wounded. The President decided to mass planes and ships in the vicinity of South Korea, and he activated fourteen Air National Guard units, eight Air Force Reserve units, and six Naval Reserve

units. He also had the U.S. ambassador to the UN request an "urgent session of the security council".¹⁸ In his memoirs, President Johnson remembered stating during the Crisis, "I do not want to win the argument and lose the sale, I consistently warned my advisers. I wanted the officers and crew of the Pueblo home alive, and I was prepared to take considerable political heat to achieve this goal."¹⁹

The statement in Appendix Q by General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman JCS, before the House Hearing Subcommittee summarizes all the available forces and alternatives.

It is important to understand all possible alternatives before making a quantifiable assessment of the communication capabilities. To quantify communications capabilities it is necessary to define what transmission success percentage is needed for a mission such as the Pueblo. Considering the risk assessment of the mission "minimal", a relatively low transmission success rate could be assumed. However, the assessment can only be used as a guide in quantifying what success rate might be necessary, for in this instance it is not the overall mission risk assessment that is important, but the highest priority message that might be sent. At the time of the Pueblo mission the following precedences were available for message traffic.

Precedence

FLASH OVERRIDE*

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

*Not a precedence. Flash OVERRIDE was a system capability reserved for use only by those individuals specified in the JCS Memorandum of Policy 151, Provision of AUTOVON Service.

The criteria and preemption features of the Joint Uniform Telephone Communications Precedence System shown below, were directed for use by all authorized users of voice communication facilities of the Department of Defense.

(1) FLASH--Flash precedence was reserved for alerts, warnings, or other emergency actions having immediate bearing on national, command or area security; i.e., Presidential use, announcement of an alert, land or sea catastrophes, intelligence reports on matters leading to enemy attack, potential or actual nuclear accident or incident, implementation of services' unilateral emergency actions procedures, etc.

Had precedence over any other telephonic call of lower precedence. Preempted lower precedence

calls. Was preempted by the application of FLASH OVERRIDE capability.

(2) IMMEDIATE--Immediate precedence was reserved for vital communications (a) having an immediate operational effect on tactical operations, (b) which directly concerned safety or rescue operations, (c) which affected the intelligence community operational role; e.g., initial vital reports of damage due to enemy action; land, sea, or air reports which must be completed from vehicles in motion such as operational mission aircraft; intelligence reports on vital actions in progress; natural disaster or widespread damage; emergency weather reports having an immediate bearing on mission in progress; emergency use for circuit restoration; use by tactical command posts for passing immediate operational traffic, etc.

Had precedence over any other telephonic call of lower precedence.

(3) PRIORITY--Priority precedence was reserved for calls which require prompt completion for national defense and security, the successful conduct of war or to safeguard life or property, which did not require higher precedence; e.g., reports of priority land, sea, or air movement; administrative, intelligence, operational or logistic activity calls requiring priority action; calls that would

have a serious impact on military, administrative, intelligence, operational or logistic activities if handled as ROUTINE calls. Normally, PRIORITY was the highest precedence assigned to administrative matters.

Had precedence over any other telephonic calls of lower precedence.

(4) ROUTINE--Routine precedence was reserved for all other official communications.

Had no precedence over any other call and is handled sequentially as placed by the calling party. No preempt.

Since the Pueblo's mission was sufficiently dangerous, her communications equipment had to be capable of handling Critic "Flash override" messages. "Flash" messages are used for actions requiring immediate attention. "Immediate" is commonly defined as "accomplishing something without delay". Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Publication 128 (JANAP 128) requires a 10 minute time of transmission to the receiving party for Flash and Flash Override messages. The Pueblo's, Pinnacle I and II messages should have met the 10 minute criteria. But Appendix N shows that Pinnacle I arrived at COMNAVFORJAP in 23 minutes, 13 minutes late for "Flash override". Pinnacle II (Appendix O) arrived in 4 minutes

thus meeting "Flash override" criteria. From COMNAVFORJAP, the communications speed dwindled quickly. Appendices N and O show quite clearly that the communication times did not meet the 10 minute criteria. For messages down the chain of command there was no established communications network, which was routine for collection missions.

For communications between different decision makers it is again necessary to look at the timeliness. From COMNAVFORJAP, there were three different decision makers that needed to be informed. Fifth Air Force, Seventh Fleet, and JCS. Appendices N and O make it obvious that these organizations were not contacted anywhere near the 10 minute time frame.

Dr. Belden, in Crisis Conferencing and the Pueblo Case, discusses three separate communications networks that must work during a crisis situation.

1. From the point of the crisis unit to the decision makers and down the chain (Critic).
2. Among the decision makers (Policy).
3. From the decision maker to the action units (Resource).

So far, this chapter has dealt with the first network and part of the 2nd network. The other part of the second network takes place in the crisis centers in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Belden dealt directly with the Washington, D.C. network, between the White House (Situation Room), Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, NSA, DIA, JCS, and the services. Dr. Belden points out, correctly, that the Policy network was set up using AUTOSEVOCOM and that because of the complexity of the system, the probability of a call being correctly set up was only .35.

He assigns a .9 probability to each step in accomplishing a secure voice AUTOSEVOCOM call.²⁰ Thus with ten steps the overall probability of successfully initiating a call would be .35 or $.9 \times .9 \times .9 \times .9 \times .9 \times .9 \times .9 \times .9 \times .9 \times .9$.²¹ Each attempt of a secure telephonic call takes approximately three minutes, and by definition for "Flash override" to be successful, it must to be completed within 10 minutes. Therefore, the Washington, D.C. decision makers had three attempts to complete the call. The probability of accomplishing a call with three attempts is

Figure v: Communications Probabilities

A	B	C	AB	AC
$(.35 + .35 + .35) - [(.35 \times .35) + (.35 \times .35) +$				
BC	ABC			
$(.35 \times .35)] + (.35 \times .35 \times .35) = 1.05 - .3675 + .0428 =$				
.7253				

This points out that even with three attempts, AUTOSEVOCOM would work from one point to another only 72.53 times out of a hundred. Considering that on a Policy network with six separate units, there could be 15 point to point calls, .7253 for each call is hardly acceptable. (See Appendix R). To raise the low probability Dr. Belden recommended setting up a conference network in the Washington, D.C. area between the six crisis centers. This would not only raise the probability of getting a call through but would also provide the policy makers with quick information.

The last communications net to be studied was the resource network. The Washington, D.C. decision makers did not initiate this net until after the Pueblo was in Wonsan Harbor. The first command in Washington, D.C. to receive Pinnacle I on the Critic Network was the Director NSA at 0446Z/2246 Saturday local, 1345 Korean time. From this message, the decision makers were not truly alerted. However, Pinnacle I could have acted as a starting point for the decision makers to collect information on the incident. Pinnacle II was the message that should have caused the resource and policy networks to be activated. The first Washington, D.C. decision makers to receive Pinnacle II were the Director NSA and the White House Situation Room at 0443Z/2243 Saturday local/1343 Korean time. Because of the retransmitting process at Kamiseya, Japan, NSA received Pinnacle I after Pinnacle II. Therefore, they were

extremely confused as to what was happening.

This was compounded by the fact that there was no resource net or "down the chain" critic net. The messages came in extremely garbled²² and there was no practical way of finding out what was really happening in Korea or what retaliation resources were available. Mr. Rostow at the White House Situation Room contacted CINCPAC HQ and talked to Air Force Major General R. B. Allison, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. Later he stated, "He was as confused as the White House about details in the situation".²³

There was 90 minutes to make a decision and act; i.e., send the planes from the Enterprise (the only practical unit). It took the decision makers much longer than that just to find out what had happened, let alone make a decision on what they could do about it.

Dr. Belden's solution to this problem is a "down the chain" crisis network, a resources network, and a formatted message for clarification. Rightfully, he concludes the Critic Network should be via secure Teletype or manual morse code, since these are the most reliable telecommunications forms. The Policy net in Washington, D.C. could be secure hard line wire, since the members never change. Finally, the Resource net could be either voice or teletype depending on the financial restraints.²⁴

In conclusion, communications (Pinnacles/Critics) were effective from the Pueblo to COMNAVFORJAP and less effective

when retransmitted to CINCPAC and Washington, D.C. There was no established "down the chain" Critic network which hampered establishment of a policy and resource network from Washington, D.C. COMNAVFORJAP's established resource network was only partially effective in tasking the Fifth Air Force's assets and was not used at all to task the assets of the Seventh Fleet.

The total system was hampered by untrained personnel who were unable to efficiently communicate with each other in a crisis.

In the next chapter, the study will deal with the lessons that could be learned from the Pueblo crisis. The total crisis will be considered, from Risk assessment through Communications problems, and all lessons will be pulled together.

NOTES

¹U.S. Congress, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo of the Committee of Armed Services, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) p. 1624.

²Frederick C. Schumacher, Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the U.S.S. Pueblo, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1970) p. 82.

³Daniel U. Gallery, The Pueblo Incident, (New York: Doubleday, 1970) p. 48.

⁴Schumacher, p. 87.

⁵U.S. Congress, p. 1666.

⁶Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: A True Story of the Pueblo Affair, (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970) p. 63.

⁷Armbrister, p. 63.

⁸Ibid, p. 65.

⁹Ibid, p. 64.

¹⁰Ibid, p. 218.

¹¹U.S. Congress, p. 1698.

¹²Armbrister, p. 219.

¹³T. G. Belden, Crisis Conferencing and the Pueblo Case, (Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, Systems Evaluation Division, 1970) p. 8.

¹⁴Gallery, p. 53.

¹⁵Armbrister, p. 219.

¹⁶U.S. Congress, p. 1671.

¹⁷Armbrister, p. 261.

¹⁸Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, (New York: Holt,

Rhinehart and Winston, 1971) p. 536.

¹⁹Johnson, p. 536.

²⁰Belden, p. 19.

²¹Ibid, p. 19-21.

²²Armbrister, p. 222.

²³Ibid, p. 222.

²⁴Belden, p. 12.

Chapter V: Conclusions

This chapter enumerates conclusions and evaluations as applied to analyses done in Chapters II, III and IV as follows:

Chapter II

The risk assessment for the Pueblo mission was studied from the standpoint of:

1. Who assigned it.
2. The procedures used to determine it.
3. Whether the risk assessment was questioned by any of the units in the process.

The total risk assessment process was completed improperly. COMNAVFORJAP did not use the JCS-established criteria for assigning a risk assessment. The assessment was passed up the chain of command with no justification, and there was no single point of coordination to consider NSA's concern over the mission..

A sample procedure for assigning a risk assessment was discussed showing how these inadequacies could have been corrected. The major points of the procedure included:

1. Establishment of a single point of responsibility, by either the JRC or DIA. This point is most important because for a risk assessment to be effective it must be responsive to changing situations worldwide. Time-sensitive

information frequently is held by a command that is unaware of an upcoming mission. The single contact point would have direct communications with the command operationally responsible for the mission so as to consolidate information, and then inform the operational reconnaissance unit involved.

2. A common-assessment criteria, objective and subjective, should be passed up the chain. This common report would be quantitative to allow rapid review by a higher command. A subjective narrative portion would be used to add a quick one-line justification for dissenting views.

The proposals were not meant to question the "minimal" risk assessment assigned to the Pueblo's mission, but to suggest a more efficient procedure. These procedures would force participants to logically and systematically analyze and report pertinent information.

Since the risk assessment was one of the first steps in the Pueblo's mission, the entire warning cycle would be affected if the assessment was completed incorrectly.

Since the risk assessment was "minimal", Rear Admiral Johnson (COMNAVFORJAP) decided not to request that the Fifth Air Force or Seventh Fleet put any planes on strip alert. Both of these commands were sent only information copies of the Pueblo's mission.¹ This decision proved disastrous for the Pueblo. It becomes especially important, when

COMNAVFORJAP and the Washington decision makers considered their options.

Chapter III

The major lessons discussed in this chapter are that:

1. No single point of control was established to consider events that happened after the risk assessment was assigned.

2. Prior to the mission CDR Bucher was not given specific guidance by either the CINCPAC or COMNAVFORJAP staffs. He was not told what to do if certain situations occurred during the mission and was not prepared to react if the ship were endangered.

3. Indicators were not developed to assess a crisis situation, for the Korean or Russian portion of the mission.

Chapter III suggests that a single coordinating point could have acted more responsively, in case of a crisis during the mission. The coordination center could have provided continuity between the assessment and the ship's mission. After the risk assessment was completed the single point of contact would have acted as a source of information for Washington, COMNAVFORJAP and CDR Bucher.

From this information guidance prior to the mission could have been given to CDR Bucher by COMNAVFORJAP. Specifically the G-2/3 intelligence/operation officers could have updated/upgraded the risk assessment and provided CDR

Bucher with an analysis of the situation. Coupled with an updated risk assessment, the staff could have templated the most probable expected events. By assigning probabilities, a quantifiable figure could have been determined and the Pueblo could have been given general guidance. However, CDR Bucher was not given any guidance. His personal beliefs and attitudes were therefore the basis of his actions. Prior guidance from COMNAVFORJAP could have assisted CDR Bucher in his assessment of the North Korean actions. Linked with not providing guidance to the Pueblo, COMNAVFORJAP and the higher headquarters were negligent in not developing a template to help evaluate the unfolding scenerio. With such an aid, the decision makers at COMNAVFORJAP, CINCPAC and in Washington, D.C. could have analyzed North Korean actions against their contingency plan.

Chapter IV

The last lesson that needs to be discussed concerns communication problems that plagued the Pueblo, its higher headquarters and adjacent action commands. The following areas were studied and found to have problems:

1. Communications timeliness was not acceptable for the following communication nets.

- A. The Critic net -- Washington decision makers to COMNAVFORJAP and from COMNAVFORJAP to the Pueblo.

- B. The Policy net -- Within the Washington network of decision makers.

C. The Resource net -- From the Washington decision makers to the action unit and from COMNAVFORJAP to the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet.

2. The ten minute time constraint from the Pueblo up the chain of command was not met for either critic message, however the time over the ten minute limit was not great enough to be considered significant.

The basic communication problem was a common failure to establish or practice communications nets.

A specific example is the voice net between COMNAVFORJAP and the Fifth Air Force. The net had never been practiced; thus, when it was needed the "routine" procedures were not handled correctly. This suggests that all communications procedures should be regularly exercised. Especially prior to an operation, all units which may need to contact each other should set up and practice the proper nets, (secure voice, teletype or manual morse code). The Pueblo crisis was a classic case in which decision makers were unable to get to the information they needed from/to the action units. The establishment and practice of communications nets could have eliminated this problem.

Finally, specific conclusions can be drawn from analyzing the warning cycle for the Pueblo's mission. The warning cycle as applied to the Pueblo starts with intelligence and information being collected. An analyst then estimates the North Korean's capabilities and

intentions. The analyst, either at the DIA or the JRC, can then decide a risk assessment for specific mission from a generic list of indicators. Then a specific list of indicators could be developed. From the list of indicators, a template of possible events with probabilities could be determined, which could be used in providing the CO of the collection platform with guidance. The next portion of the warning cycle includes the actual warning. In the Pueblo case the warnings would have been provided at many different stages before the capture. In particular, two events come to mind: the NSA warning message and the ship's Pinnacle/Critic II. In any warning cycle the process is not totally sequential. The cycle may jump backwards many times before moving forward. For example, when the NSA questioned the risk assessment, the appropriate DIA/JRC personnel should have restarted the cycle at the information/intelligence point.

After the warning has been given the decision maker can take preparatory action, defer such action or ignore the warning. Whether taking an action means the decision maker must actually do something, (a theory supported by Dr. Belden) is debatable. Mr. Betts contends instead that the decision maker can accept the warning but he does not have to physically take action.

The Pueblo incident was a classic case of warning failure. The intelligence/information was collected but not consolidated at any single point of control. Since the

information was not consolidated it was impossible for a realistic risk assessment to be assigned. This was coupled with not using the JCS criteria and oversimplification of the risk assessment report, up the chain of command. The North Korean's capabilities and intentions were misrepresented due to the coordination problems. In conjunction with not adequately analysing what the North Koreans could do, the decision makers did not calculate the probabilities of specific events happening to the Pueblo. This is imperative for any collection mission. Since COMNAVFORJAP, CINCPAC or DIA did not calculate these probabilities they could not provide subjective guidance to CDR Bucher; therefore CDR Bucher was basically on his own.

Strategic, political and tactical signals of hostility from the North Koreans were misread as noise, propaganda or harassment. Some of these signals were not passed up the chain of command while those that were, were not coordinated. When the NSA questioned the risk assessment, its message was not properly staffed. Any of the many warnings should have restarted the cycle at the intelligence/information stage, leading to a revision of the risk assessment. A template could have been used to understand each specific event's significance and to reassign a different set of probabilities, to expected outcomes.

The decision is the final step in the warning cycle. Assuming that the decision maker does not have to take

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
THE USS PUEBLO INCIDENT WARNING CYCLE(U) DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE COLL WASHINGTON DC K D KOEBKE 18 SEP 84


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physical action, then for the Pueblo crisis the total warning cycle would be complete. However if it is assumed that the decision maker must take some action, then it becomes important that he/she be knowledgeable of the situation on board the Pueblo, the assets which he/she could use and be able to direct these assets. This was not accomplished during the Pueblo crisis, therefore the warning cycle was not completed.

In studying the problems associated with the warning cycle certain lessons can be developed from this crisis. The thesis has identified lessons which can be learned from the crisis and tried to give reasonable suggestions on how to correct the problems. It has neither tried to correct the problems, nor compare the warning cycle process at the time of the Pueblo crisis with the process today. This thesis could trigger further study into the historical and present day warning cycle. It should be noted that while each crisis has unique characteristics, there may be value in comparing conclusions from this case with those derived from other crisis situations, such as the U.S.S. Liberty, and the EC-121 incidents. This thesis could act as a prototype in studying other crises and in evaluating the total system as it was fifteen years ago and today.

NOTES

¹U.S. Congress, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo:
Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S.
Pueblo of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) p. 1644.

Appendix A: Pueblo's Operational Orders:
December, 1967

Declassified by
COMNAVFORJAP
31 December 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

VZCZCNJA561
RR RUABPO RUAMWC RUAAUWZ
DE RUANJ 025 3520754
ZNY SSSSS
R 180752Z DEC 67
FM COMNAVFORJAPAN
INFO O RUAMWC/COMUSKOREA
RUAM O RUAMWC/COMNAVFORKOREA
RUABP O/N SAPACOFF JAPAN
RUAAUWZ/FIFTH AF FUCHUV USFJ
P R 161106Z DEC 67
FM COMNAVFORJAPAN
TO CINCPACFLT
INFO COMSEVENTHFLT
COMSERVPAC
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
NAVSECGRUACT KAMISEYA
OCEANAV
USS PUEBLO

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

BT
SECRET LIMDIS NOFORN
PINKROOT OPERATION ONE (C)
A. CINCPACFLTINST 003120.24A
B. CINCPACFLTINST 03100.3D

1. FOLLOWING SUBMITTED IAW REF A:
A. JUSTIFICATION: SUBJ OPERATION WILL PRIMARILY BE
CONDUCTED IN SEA OF JAPAN TO:

(1) DETERMINE NATURE AND EXTENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITY
VICINITY OF NORTH KOREAN (KORCOM) PORTS OF CHONGJIN,
SONGJIN, MAYANG DO AND WONSON.

(2) SAMPLE ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT OF EAST COAST
NORTH KOREA, WITH EMPHASIS ON INTERCEPT/FIXING OF COASTAL
RADARS.

(3) INTERCEPT AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET
NAVAL UNITS

PAGE 2 RUANJ 032 S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN
OPERATING TSUSHIMA STRAITS IN EFFORT TO DETERMINE PURPOSE OF
SOVIET PRESENCE IN THAT AREA SINCE FEB 1966. SECONDLY, THE
OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO:

(A) DETERMINE KORCOM AND SOVIET REACTION
RESPECTIVELY TO AN OVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATING
NEAR KORCOM PERIPHERY AND ACTIVELY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE
OF USSR NAVAL UNITS.

(B) EVALUATE USS PUEBLO'S (AGER-2)
CAPABILITIES AS A NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND TACTICAL
SURVEILLANCE SHIP.

(C) REPORT ANY DEPLOYMENT OF KORCOM/SOVIET UNITS WHICH MAY BE INDICATIVE OF PENDING HOSTILITIES OR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST U. S. FORCES.

B. ESTIMATE OF RISK: MINIMAL, SINCE PUEBLO WILL BE OPERATING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS FOR ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT.

C. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE AS SET FORTH IN REF A. REF B IS APPLICABLE WITH REGARDS PUEBLO'S CONDUCT IN EVENT OF HARASSMENT OR INTIMIDATION. CO COGNIZANT OF PUEBLO'S VULNERABILITY TO FATAL DAMAGE DUE TO COLLISION.

D. DIRECT LIAISON CONDUCTED OR WILL BE REQUIRED WITH:

(1) DIRNAVSECGRUPAC

PAGE ONE OF TWO COPY 2 OF SIX COPIES 161106Z DEC 67
DECLASSIFIED BY COMNAVFORJAPAN ON 31 DECEMBER 1968

PAGE 3 RUANJ 032 S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN

- (2) PACOM ELINT CENTER
- (3) NAVSECGRUACT KAMISEYA
- (4) NSAPACOFF JAPAN
- (5) COMUSKOREA
- (6) COMNAVFORKOREA

E. OPERATIONAL INFO:

- (1) USS PUEBLO (AGER-2)
- (2) SASEBO, 8 JAN 68

(3) (A) PROCEED VIA TSUSHIMA STRAITS TO ARR OPAREA MARS APPROX 10 JAN.

(B) OPERATE OPAREAS PLUTO, VENUS AND MARS, CONCENTRATING EFFORTS IN AREA(S) WHICH APPEAR MOST LUCRATIVE.

(C) DEPART OPAREAS 27 JAN. PROCEED SOUTH ALONG KOREAN COAST TO VICINITY TSUSHIMA STRAITS.

(D) INTERCEPT AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET NAVAL UNITS OPERATING TSUSHIMA STRAITS.

(E) TERMINATE SURVEILLANCE TO ARR SASEBO NLT 040001Z FEB.

(4) CPA TO KORCOM/SOVIET LAND MASS/OFF SHORE ISLANDS WILL BE 13 NM. PUEBLO WILL OPERATE AT LEAST 500 YARDS FROM SOVIET UNITS EXCEPT TO CLOSE BRIEFLY TO 200 YARDS AS NECESSARY FROM VISUAL/PHOTO

PAGE 4 RUAUNJ 032 S E C R E T LIMDIS NOFORN

COVERAGE. ADDITIONALLY, PUEBLO WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH SOVIET EXERCISES. PUEBLO WILL, HOWEVER, MAINTAIN A POSITION ON THE PERIPHERY FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES.

(5) ARR SASEBO, 4 FEB

(6) ABOVE OPAREAS ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) EAST/WEST BOUNDARIES ARE CONTIGUOUS TO KORCOM COAST EXTENDING FROM 13 NM CPA TO LAND MASS/OFF SHORE ISLANDS SEAWARD TO 60 NM.

(B) NORTH/SOUTH BOUNDARIES ARE PLUTO 42-00N TO 41-00N; VENUS 41-00N TO 40-00N; AND MARS 40-00N TO 39-00N.

CP-1

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PAGE TWO OF TWO

161106Z DEC 67

Appendix B: Pueblo's Sailing Orders:
January, 1968

SECRET

PRIORITY
P 050512Z JAN 68
FM CTF NINE SIX

TO USS PUEBLO

INFO AIG SEVEN SIX TWO TWO
COMSERVGRU THREE
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
COMUSKOREA
COMNAVFORKOREA
PACOMELINT CENTER

LIMDIS NOFORN

S E C R E T LIMIDIS NOFORN

- A. CTF 96 OPORD 301-68 NOTAL
- B. PACOM ELINT CENTER 210734Z DEC 67 PASEP NOTAL
- C. CINCPACFLTINST 003120.24A
- D. CINCPACFLTINST 03100.3D

1. ICHTHYIC ONE FORMERLY PINKROOT ONE

2. DEPART SASEBO JAPAN WHEN RFS ABOUT 8 JAN 68. CHECK OUT OF MOVREP SYSTEM AND PROCEED VIA TSUSHIMA STRAITS TO ARRIVE OPAREA MARS ABOUT 10 JAN.

3. ATTEMPT TO AVOID DETECTION BY SOVIET NAVAL UNITS WHILE PROCEEDING TO OPAREA MARS.

4. UPON ARRIVAL MARS, CONDUCT ICHTHYIC OPS IAW PROVISIONS REF A.

A. OPERATE OPAREAS MARS, VENUS AND PLUTO, CONCENTRATING EFFORTS IN AREA(S) WHICH APPEAR MOST LUCRATIVE.

B. DEPART OPAREAS 27 JAN AND IF NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE MAINTAIN STRICT EMCON CONDITION. PROCEED SOUTH ALONG KOREAN COAST TO VICINITY TSUSHIMA STRAITS.

C. INTERCEPT AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET NASIMA STRAITS.

D. TERMINATE SURVEILLANCE TO ARRIVE SASEBO 4 FEB 68. EARLIER DEPARTURE AUTHORIZED TO ENSURE TEN PERCENT ON-BOARD FUEL UPON ARRIVAL SASEBO.

Declassified

Authority Deputy Secretary of Defense
September 12, 1968

/s/Paul H. Nitze
PAUL H. NITZE

5. OPAREAS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

A. EAST/WEST BOUNDARIES ALL AREAS ARE CONTIGUOUS TO KORCOM AST EXTENDING FROM THIRTEEN NM CPA TO LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDS SEAWARD SIXTY NM.

B. NORTHSOUTH BOUNDARIES ARE:

MARS. 40-00N4 TO 39-00N2;

VENUS. 41-00N5 TO 40-00N4;

PLUTO. 42-00N6 TO 41-00N5.

6. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

A. COLLECT ELINT IAW PROVISIONS REF B, ON NOT TO INTERFERE BASIS WITH BASIC MISSION.

B. CPA TO KORCOM/SOVIET LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDS WILL BE THIRTEEN NM.

C. UPON ESTABLISHING FIRM CONTACT WITH SOVIET NAVAL UNITS, BREAK EMCON AND TRANSMIT DAILY SITREP.

D. OPERATE AT LEAST FIVE HUNDRED YDS FROM SOVIET UNITS EXCEPT TO CLOSE BRIEFLY TO TWO HUNDRED YDS AS NECESSARY FOR VISUAL/PHOTO COVERAGE.

E. DO NOT INTERFERE WITH SOVIET EXERCISES BUT MAINTAIN A POSITION ON THE PERIPHERY FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES.

F. IF UNABLE TO ESTABLISH OR GAIN CONTACT WITH SOVIET UNITS WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS ARRIVAL TSUSHIMA STRAITS AREA, ADVISE ORIG. IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.

G. PROVISIONS REF APPLY RELIDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. IF D APPLIES REGARDING CONDUCT IN EVENT OF HARASSMENT OF INTIMIDATION BY FOREIGN UNITS.

H. INJSOLLED DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT SHOULD BE STOWED OR COVERED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO NOT ELICIT UNUSUAL INTEREST FROM SURVEYING/SURVEYED UNIT(S). EMPLOY ONLY IN CASES WHERE THREAT TO SURVIVAL IS OBVIOUS.

CP-3

LIMDIS

Appendix C: The Crew of the Pueblo

Their rank is of the day of capture

Commanding Officer,
Commander Lloyd Bucher,
Pocatello, Idaho
Naval Security Group Detachment Officer,
Lieutenant Stephen R. Harris,
Melrose, Massachusetts
Executive Officer,
Lieutenant Edward R. Murphy,
San Diego, California
Operations Officer,
Lieutenant (j.g.) Carl F. Schumacher,
St. Louis, Missouri
Ensign Timothy L. Harris
Jacksonville, Florida
Chief Warrant Officer Gene H. Lacy,
Seattle, Washington

Steward's Mate Rogelio P. Abelon,
Ambabaaay, Philippines
Communications Technician Michael W. Alexander,
Richland, Washington
Steward's Mate Rizalino L. Aluague,
Subic City, Philippines
Communications Technician Wayne D. Anderson,
Waycross, Georgia
Fireman Richard F. Arnold,
Santa Rosa, California
Communications Technician Charles W. Ayling,
Staunton, Virginia
Communications Technician Don E. Bailey,
Portland, Indiana
Hospital Corpsman Herman P. Baldrige,
Carthage, Missouri
Fireman Richard I. Bame,
Maybee, Michigan
Fireman Peter M. Bandera,
Carson City, Nevada
Communications Technician Michael T. Barrett,
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Boatswain's Mate Ronald L. Berens,
Russell, Kansas
Fireman Howard E. Bland,
Leggett, California
Engineman Rushel J. Blansett,
Orange, California
Communications Technician Ralph D. Bouden,
Nampa, Idaho
Communications Technician Paul D. Brusnahan,
Trenton, New Jersey

Boatswain's Mate Willie C. Bussell,
 Hopkinsville, Kentucky
 Yeoman Armando M. Canales,
 Fresno, California
 Marine Sergeant Robert J. Chicca,
 Hyattsville, Maryland
 Radioman Charles H. Crandell,
 El Reno, Oklahoma
 Communications Technician Bradley R. Crowe,
 Island Pond, Vermont
 Communications Technician Rodney H. Duke,
 Fayette, Mississippi
 Seaman Stephen P. Ellis,
 Los Angeles, California
 Communications Specialist Victor D. Escamilla,
 Amarillo, Texas
 Storekeeper Policarpo P. Garcia,
 Point Mugu, California
 Communications Technician Francis J. Ginther,
 Pottsville, Pennsylvania
 Chief Engineman Monroe O. Goldman,
 Lakewood, California
 Communications Technician John W. Grant,
 Jay, Maine
 Electrician's Mate Gerald Hagenson,
 Bremerton, Washington
 Marine Sergeant Robert J. Hammond,
 Claremont, New Hampshire
 Radioman Lee R. Hayes,
 Columbus, Ohio
 Fireman John C. Higgins, Jr.,
 St. Joseph, Missouri
 Seaman Robert W. Hill,
 Ellwood City, Tennessee
 Fireman Duane Hodges,
 Cresswell, Oregon
 Communications Technician Jerry Karnes,
 Havana, Arkansas
 Communications Technician James F. Kell,
 Culver City, California
 Communications Technician Earl M. Kisler,
 St. Louis, Missouri
 Boatswain's Mate Norbert J. Klepae,
 San Diego, California
 Communications Technician Anthony A. Lamantia,
 Toronto, Ohio
 Communications Technician Peter M. Langenberg,
 Clayton, Missouri
 Quartermaster Charles B. Law,
 Chehalis, Washington
 Communications Technician James D. Layton,
 Binghamton, New York
 Signalman Wendell G. Leach,
 Houston, Texas


Commissaryman Harry Lewis,
 Springfield Gardens, New York
 Photographer's Mate Lawrence W. Mack,
 San Diego, California
 Seaman Roy J. Maggard,
 Olivehurst, California
 Seaman Larry J. Marshall,
 Austin, Indiana
 Fireman Thomas W. Massie,
 Roscoe, Illinois
 Communications Technician Donald R. McClarren,
 Johnstown, Pennsylvania
 Communications Technician Ralph McClintock,
 Milton, Massachusetts
 Fireman John A. Mitchell,
 Dixon, California
 Electronics Technician Clifford C. Nolte,
 Adel, Iowa
 Fireman Michael A. O'Bannon,
 Beaverton, Oregon
 Communications Technician Donald R. Peppard,
 Phoenix, Arizona
 Seaman Earl R. Phares,
 Ontario, California
 Quartermaster Alvin H. Plucker,
 Trenton, Nebraska
 Commissaryman Ralph E. Reed,
 Perdix, Pennsylvania
 Seaman Dale E. Rigby,
 Ogden, Utah
 Communications Technician David L. Ritter,
 Union City, California
 Communicaitons Technician Steven J. Robin,
 Silver Spring, Maryland
 Seaman Richard J. Rogala,
 Niles, Illinois
 Seaman Ramon Rosales,
 El Paso, Texas
 Seaman Edward S. Russell,
 Glendale, California
 Engineman William W. Scarborough,
 Anderson, South California
 Communications Technician James A. Shephard,
 Williamstown, Massachusetts
 Communications Technician John A. Shilling,
 Mantua, Ohio
 Seaman John R. Shingleton,
 Atoka, Oklahoma
 Fireman Norman W. Spear,
 Portland, Maine
 Communicaitons Technician Charles R. Sterling,
 Omaha, Nebraska
 Communicaitons Technician Angelo S. Strano,
 Hartford, Connecticut

Fireman Larry E. Strickland,
Grand Rapids, Michigan
Gunner's Mate Kenneth R. Wadley,
Beaverton, Oregon
Fireman Steven E. Woelk,
Alta Vista, Kansas
Communications Technician Elton A. Wood,
Spokane, Washington
Engineman Darrel D. Wright,
Alma, West Virginia

Harry Tredale, III (Civilian),
Holmes, Pennsylvania
Dunnie Tuck, (Civilian),
Richmond, Virginia

Appendix D: Ship's Location

USS Pueblo location from 11 January to 23 January 1968.



Appendix E: Statement of General Woodward

The Government of the United States of America, acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS "Pueblo" and of the documents of evidence produced by the representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect that the ship, which seized by the self-defense measures of the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on January 23, 1968, had illegally intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on many occasions and conducted espionage activities of spying out important military and state secrets of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the U.S. ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after having intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Korea,

And gives firm assurance that no U.S. ships will intrude again in the future into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Meanwhile, the Government of the United States of America earnestly requests the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to deal leniently with the former

crew members of the USS "Pueblo" confiscated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side, taking into consideration the fact that these crew members have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the Government of the Democratic People's Republic for leniency.

Simultaneous with signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the USS "Pueblo" and one corpse.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America,

Gilbert H. Woodward,
Major General, United States Army

23 Dec., 1968.

Appendix F: Sample Risk Assessment Procedure

An Operations officer was selected to play the role of the assessment officer at COMNAVFORJAP. He was asked to assign probabilities between .001 and .999 to three possible outcomes. The ship would conduct a mission off the North Korean coast in January 1968. It must be remembered that in a real situation, the assessment officer would probably recognize the incident and be biased by events one through six. This needs to be considered in the light that this assessment process would hopefully have been going on for a number of years and that it would have corrected the bias problem:

Hypothesis 1. The ship being damaged in some physical manner.

Hypothesis 2. The ship being harassed but not physically damaged by a foreign government's agent.

Hypothesis 3. All other possible outcomes.

The operations officer assigned these probabilities, with single sentence justification:

P(Hy)

Hypothesis ¹	.1
Hypothesis ²	.4
Hypothesis ³	.5

Justification: The ship would be in international water, so a nation would not physically attack the ship, however, they might harass the ship to test its power.

The operations officer was then asked to assign probabilities to each of the following events happening, given each hypothesis.

A. The U.S.S. Banner had conducted two transits of the North Korean Coast in 1967 and was not harassed.

B. In April 1965, a U.S. Air Force RB-4 was damaged by North Korean fire while conducting operations 35 to 40 NM off the nearest land mass.

C. There was an increase in border incidents by North Korean troops in 1967.

D. On 19 January 1967, a Republic of Korea naval vessel was sunk by North Korean coastal artillery.

E. In November 1967, the North Koreans "flushed" MIG-21 aircraft on a U.S. reconnaissance plane near Wonsan Harbot.

F. The North Koreans had consistently gone "on alert" when U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft veered close to their land mass.

For each event, a one sentence justification was given:

P(hypothesis)		$P(E_1/hy)$	$P(E_2/hy)$	$P(E_3/hy)$
$P(hy_1)$.1	.1	.5	.1
$P(hy_2)$.4	.2	.4	.6
$P(hy_3)$.5	.7	.2	.4

	$P(E_4/hy)$	$P(E_5/hy)$	$P(E_6/hy)$
$P(hy_1)$.1	.1	.1
$P(hy_2)$.7	.8	.8
$P(hy_3)$.2	.2	.2

	Row	Revised $P(hy)$
$P(hy_1)$.0000005	.00005
$P(hy_2)$.0086016	.7933
$P(hy_3)$.0022400	.2066

Justification: E_1 -- This would indicate that future ships would not be harassed if in international waters, off the North Korean Coast.

E_2 -- The North Koreans were capable of attacking aircraft in international waters. They had identified the plane, thus they could identify a ship and harass or damage it.

E₃ -- The North Koreans are interested in political gain by creating crisis situations. Harassing ships would be an excellent opportunity.

E₄ -- This indicates the North Koreans were capable of attacking a ship, as far out as artillery rounds will go, approximately 20 NM.

E₅ -- The North Koreans could recognize reconnaissance platform and react quickly.

E₆ -- Same as E₅.

The preceding data with justifications would have been sent to CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT for review. Since neither of these commands had any additional information, it can be assumed that they would have forwarded the data/justification without adding or changing anything. DIA would be the office to coordinate the risk assessment. The only agency that would have had additional information would have been NSA. Under this plan, NSA would have sent the information to DIA and the action officer at DIA would have incorporated it into the data. If the NSA "warning message" was received by DIA after the risk assessment had been assigned, the information would have been analyzed by the DIA action officer and then forwarded back down the chain of assessments. This procedure would help ascertain if any

member in the chain of command had second thoughts after given the new information.

Another operations officer acting as the DIA officer responsible for the risk assessment was asked to study the data/justifications sent from CINCPAC and then to add probabilities for E_7 and E_8 which came from the NSA "warning message".

E_7 -- Since 1966 the North Korean Air Force has had an additional role of Naval support.

E_8 -- North Korean Navy has been reacting to Republic of Korea fishing vessels.

The operations officer assigned:

P(hypothesis)	(E_7/Hy)	(E_8/Hy)	Row	Revised P(hy)
P(hy ₁)	.1	.1	.0000005	approx. 0
P(hy ₂)	.2	.7	.0012040	.91
P(hy ₃)	.3	.2	.0001344	.09

Justification: E_7 -- This would have little effect on the risk assessment, since the data was two years old.

E_8 -- If North Korea could react to fishing vessels, they would certainly react to a U.S. Navy vessel; probably not to the point of attacking it, but probably to the point of harassing it.

After computing the new revised hypothesis, the responsible DIA officer felt that the operating and supporting units should be contacted and informed that the possibility of harassment may have increased. At that point, it would be up to the operational commander COMNAVFORJAP to take action.

This procedure should also have been done assuming the ship was within the North Korean 12 NM territorial water limit.

A note of caution; the figures were subjectively arrived at and as such should act as a tip off to the decision maker but not be his sole source for action. Also, this is only a risk assessment, not an operational assessment of the mission's possible gains and losses.

Appendix G: Communication Listing

Note: Numbers 1-31 on the left of the chart correspond to the warnings explained in Chapter III. The numbers under each unit indicate that they received that warning.

U.S Embassy Seoul	COMNAV- FORJAP	CINCPAC	DIA	State Dept	Commander Bucher
1.	1	1	1	1	1
2.					
3.	3			3	
4.	4			4	
5.	5			5	
6.	6				
7.	7				
8.	8	8	8	8	
9.					9
10.					10
11.	11				11
12.	12				12
13.	13				13
14.	14	14	14		14
15.					15
16.	16	16	16	16	16
17.	17	17	17	17	17
18.					18
19.	19	19	19	19	19
20.	20	20	20	20	20
21.	21	21	21	21	21
22.	22	22	22	22	22
23.					23
24.	24	24	24	24	24
25.					25
26.					26
27.	27	27	27	27	27
28.	28	28	28	28	28
29.	29	29	29	29	29
30.	30	30	30	30	30
31.	31	31	31	31	31

Appendix H: Revised Hypothesis

The operations officer who is acting as the DIA officer was given the following events and asked to give probabilities to Events 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 given Hy_1 or Hy_2 or Hy_3 .

	E_9/H	E_{10}/H	E_{11}/H	E_{12}/H	E_{13}/H
Hy_1	.01	.1	.05	.1	.1
Hy_2	.5	.7	.5	.7	.9
Hy_3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.1


	Row	Revised Hypothesis
Hy_1	.00000024	approx. 0
Hy_2	.12841920	.991
Hy_3	<u>.00108864</u>	.009

TOTAL .12950784


Short justifications were not necessary for risk assignment of probability because unless the DIA assessment officer analyzed a major change in risk assessment, he/she would be the only one to receive the information. If he/she did analyze a major change in risk assessment then a special message would need to be sent to the operational commander

COMNAVFORJAP and the Captain of the Pueblo. In this particular case the new revised hypothesis almost totally deletes any chance of the Pueblo being attacked however, Hypothesis 2 changes from .91 to .991 and Hypothesis 3 changes from .09 to .009. The DIA assessment officer felt this was sufficient to send a message to COMNAVFORJAP and the Commanding Officer of the Pueblo, informing them of this change with justification of how the new probabilities came about.


Appendix I: Probability Tree I




Appendix J: Probability Tree II



Appendix K: Probability Tree III



Appendix L: Probability Tree IV



Appendix M: Pueblo's Radio Transmissions

Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-03P1: gm
Memo 457-69
13 March 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK SLATINSHEK (STAFF COUNSEL, SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEE, Pueblo INQUIRY)

Subj: Pueblo Incident (U)

Encl: (L) Chronology of Radio Transmissions to and from
the Pueblo pertinent to the seizure

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith as requested.

(s)

LESLIE J. O'BRIEN, JR.,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations
for Pueblo Matters

UNCLASSIFIED

Chronology of all radio transmissions to and from the Pueblo pertinent to the seizure commencing the day before the seizure through the time Pueblo went off the air.

1. Background.

a. The first record of contact by Pueblo with a shore station is approximately 0920Z/22 JAN (1820 local). At this time Pueblo broke radio silence and called NAVCOMMSTA JAPAN on primary CW ship to shore (1306 KHz) and requested activation of 100 wpm ORESTES covered communications with Kamiseya. This was in accordance with her communications instructions.

b. Communications from ship to the shore in this area is sometimes difficult due to the propagation conditions which vary with the different times of the day. According to the reports from the commanding officer of the Naval Communications Station in Japan, communications to some of the areas from the Sea of Japan are not always satisfactory. That is, selection of the proper frequencies in order to maintain communications reliably under those poor propagation conditions. Thirteen different frequencies were tried prior to establishment of a two-way circuit with Pueblo.

c. The circuit was established at 1054 Korean local

time on 23 January 1968. This circuit was a 100 word-per-minute, simplex (one-way reversible), crypto-covered, high frequency radio teletype circuit. The circuit was activated continuously from 1054 until 1432 when Pueblo went off the air to destroy crypto equipment.

d. The following chronology picks up with Pueblo's transmission of SITREP 1 at 231100 Korean time. Korean local time is used throughout except date-time groups are given in GMT(Z) and Korean local time.

2. Chronology

Korean

Local

<u>Time</u>	<u>Transmissions</u>	<u>Actions Taken</u>
1100	Pueblo completed transmission of SITREP 1 (DTG 220915Z). This report was addressed to AIG 7622.	CNF (CTF-96) Watch Officer Intelligence read/filed on interest board.
1135	Pueblo completed transmission of Intel/Tech Rpt #1 (DTG 220802 Z/221720 Korean). Precedence was Routine and message was addressed to fifteen activities.	Routine patrol, no action required.

<p>1140 Pueblo completed service message (a request for missing COPI broadcast numbers) (DTG 221126 Z/222026 Korean).</p>	<p>Routine action taken to rebroadcast missing numbers requested.</p>
<p>1150 Pueblo completed transmission of SITREP 2 (DTG 230150 Z/231050 Korean). This report had Priority precedence and was addressed for action to CTF-96 and to the following for information</p>	<p>CNFI (CTF-96) Watch officers in Intelligence read/filed on interest board.</p>

COMMANDING GENERAL, FIFTH AIR FORCE
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC AIR FORCE
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
 COMMANDER, FLEET AIR WING SIX
 COMMANDER SERVICE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
 COMMANDER, SEVENTH FLEET
 DIRECTOR, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP
 FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
 HEADQUARTERS, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, PACIFIC
 JOINTS CHIEFS OF STAFF
 NAVAL FIELD OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
 NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY (KAMISEYA)

OCEANOGRAPHER OF THE NAVY

1200 Pueblo operator stated he had another message being prepared for transmission and that there was "COMPANY OUTSIDE".

1210 Pueblo transmitted INTEL/TECH REPT number 2 (DTG 230206 Z/231106 Korean). For period 220001 Z-220001 Z. Precedence was Routine and message was addressed to several (15) intelligence activities.	Routine patrol; no action required as indicated.
---	--

1210- Exchange of transmissions between Pueblo and Kamiseya operators regarding garbled or misunderstood portions of four messages sent by Pueblo; reruns of parts of messages, checks of routing indicators assigned, etc. At approximately 1230, Pueblo operator advised, "DON'T WANT TO GO

DOWN YET. WE STILL GOT COMPANY OUTSIDE. WILL ADVISE ASAP."

1245- Exchange of transmissions between operators, primarily personnel chatter, such as; sea duty is rough, be glad to get back, see you about 7 FEB, etc. At end of period, Pueblo operator sent, "I AM TRYING TO FIND OUT WHAT THE OIC WANTS (Garble) NOW BUT EVERYONE IS TOPSIDE WORRYING (Garble) HAVE RIGHT NOW WILL ADVISE ASAP". This was followed shortly by, "CHANGE YOUR TAPE AND GOT A FLASH COMING FOR YOU NOW. AM GETTING IT READY NOW. STANDBY FOR FLASH."

1250- Pueblo transmitted OPREP 3/
1254 PINNACLE 1 message (DTG 230352 Z/231252 Korean) twice and Kamiseya receipted at 1254. Kamiseya advised, "FLASH GONE", indicating message was being relayed.

1255- Pueblo operator advised, "GOT SOME MORE COMING SOON SO WILL HAVE TO STAY UP. WILL ADVISE WHEN WE GET READY FOR YOU". Kamiseya acknowledged this and requested a rerun of a line from a previous message. Pueblo complied. Kamiseya acknowledged and sent, "DO YOU HAVE ANYMORE TRAFFIC?" Pueblo response was, "GOT SOME MORE COMING IN A MINUTE BUT DON'T HAVE IT IN COMM YET. WILL PASS IT AS SOON AS I GET. IT IS WORSE OUT HERE NOW, GOT MORE COMPANY AND NOT DOING SO GOOD WITH THEM SO WILL HAVE TO KEEP THIS CIRCUIT UP, WILL ADVISE ASAP AND PLEASE STAY WITH ME ON CIRCUIT".

PINNACLE 1 was received by CNFJ at 1313 and hand-delivered to Chief Staff by Intelligence watch officer. Also delivered to OPCON-CENTER Harassment reported was no more than expected nor as bad as previously experienced by BANNER (AGER 1).

1315- Kamiseya acknowledged the above
1317 and sent, "KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN ABOUT THAT COMPANY AND WILL STAY DOWN SO YOU CAN COME TO ME. HOW TO PUT ON TEST ON YOUR NEXT START UNTIL YOU GET YOUR TRAFFIC SO WE

CAN KEEP FREQ FAIRLY CLEAR?"

Pueblo complied and ran a test tape for about a minute.

1318- Pueblo transmitted OPREP 3/ PINNACLE 2 message (DTG 230415 Z/231315 Korean) once and Kamiseya receipted. Pueblo voluntarily retransmitted the message. This message was the first indication that more than harassment was involved.

Kamiseya relayed message to CNFJ, who received at 1322. Intelligence watch officer hand-delivered to Chief of Staff who ordered, "RELAY INFO TO 5TH AF AND PUSH THE BUTTON FOR CONTINGENCY ACTION".

1322- No transmission between

1325 Pueblo and Kamiseya other than repeats of PINNACLE 2.

1328 Pueblo again commenced sending PINNACLE 2 but interrupted to send, "NORTH KOREAN WAR VESSELS PLAN TO OPEN FIRE, SHIP POSIT 39-25.5N, 127-54.9E, SHIP POSIT 39-25.5N, 127-54,9E". Kamiseya acknowledged this and

Kamiseya was now relaying all Pueblo transmissions in near real time to CNFJ by secure tele-type circuit. At 1330 CNFJ initiated

asked, "HOW MANY FLASH HAVE YOU first phone call
SENT US?" Kamiseya continued to (secure) to 5 AF HQ
acknowledge receipt of Pueblo for assistance.
posit info, and invited Pueblo
to transit.

1330 Pueblo transmitted, "WE ARE
BEING BOARDED," five times fol-
lowed by two repeats of previous
ship's position, and two repeats
of, "WE ARE BEING BOARDED." "SOS"
was then sent thirteen times, fol-
lowed by two transmissions of a
revised ship's position, "39-34N,
127-54E", eighteen more SOSs and
the new position once more. Kami-
seya acknowledged receipt of all
these transmissions and invited
Pueblo to continue sending.

1331 Pueblo resumed transmitting a few minutes later with, "WE ARE HOLDING EMERGENCY DESTRUC- TION. WE NEED HELP. WE ARE HOLDING EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION. WE NEED SUPPORT. SOS SOS SOS. PLEASE SEND ASSISTANCE (sent	At 1335, CNFJ trans- mitted a special procedure message based on contents of PINNACLE 2 and "chatter" from Pueblo.
--	--

four times), SOS SOS SOS. WE
ARE BEING BOARDED. HOLDING
EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION."

Kamiseya acknowledged and
again invited Pueblo to
continue sending.

1331- At about 1337, Pueblo advised,
1337 "WE ARE LAYING TO AT PRESENT
POSITION. AS OF YET WE NO LON-
GER HAVE GOPI (WESTPACOPINTEL
broadcast). THIS CIRCUIT ONLY
CIRCUIT ACTIVE ON NIP. PLEASE
SEND ASSISTANCE. WE ARE BEING
BOARDED."

1338 Kamiseya responded to last
Pueblo transmission "QSL
(roger) YOUR LAST AND PASSING
ALL INFO." No other trans-
missions this period, except
a call by Kamiseya for Pueblo
to transmit.

Kamiseya readdressed
PINNACLE 2 as a spec-
ial procedure message
at 1338. At 1340
Kamiseya readdressed
PINNACLE 1 as a
special procedure
message.

1345- At 1345 Pueblo advised, "We
1409 ARE BEING ESCORTED INTO PROB

1. At 1346 CNFJ ini-
tiated a second

WONSON REPEAT WONSON. WE ARE
BEING ESCORTED INTO PROB
WONSON REPEAT WONSON". Kami-
seya acknowledged this trans-
mission and the following
exchange took place for the
remainder of the period:

special procedure
message based on
Pueblo chatter about
boarding.

Pueblo-"ARE YOU SENDING AS-
SISTANCE" (four times)

2. Subsequently, a
total of 15 "follow-
ups" special proce-
dure were originated
by CNFJ and Kamiseya
based on "chatter"
Pueblo.

Kamiseya-"WORD HAS GONE TO
ALL AUTHORITIES. WORD HAS GONE
ALL AUTHORITIES. COMNAVFORJAPAN
IS REQUESTING ASSIT. WHAT KEY
LIST DO YOU HAVE LEFT?"

"LAST WE GOT FROM YOU WAS
'ARE YOU SENDING ASSIT'.
PLEASE ADVISE WHAT KEY LIST
YOU HAVE LEFT AND IF IT APPEARS
THAT YOUR COMM SPACES WILL BE
ENTERED?"

3. Throughout the
period CNFJ made
several telephone
calls to Commander,
5th AF with respect
to AF assistance. At

1350 5th AF HQ ad-
vised no aircraft on
alert.

Pueblo-"HAVE O KEYLIST AND THIS
ONLY ONE HAVE, HAVE BEEN REQUEST-
ED TO FOLLOW INTO WONSON, HAVE
THREE WOUNDED AND ONE MAN WITH
LEG BLOWN OFF, HAVE NOT USED ANY
WEAPONS OR UNCOVERED 50-CAL. MAC.
DESTROYING ALL KEYLISTS AND AS
MUCH ELE EQUIPT AS POSSIBLE. HOW
ABOUT SOME HELP, THESE GUYS MEAN
BUSINESS. HAVE SUSTAINED SMALL
WOUND IN RECTUM, DO NOT INTEND
TO OFFER ANY RESISTANCE. INTER-
ROGATIVE QSL. INTERROGATIVE QSL.
DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG WILL BE ABLE
TO HOLD UP CIRCUIT AND DO NOT
KNOW IF COMM SPACES WILL BE
ENTERTAINED".

Kamiseya-"ROGER, ROGER. WE DOING
ALL WE CAN. CAPT HERE AND CNFJ ON
HOTLINE. LAST I GOT WAS AIR FORCE
GOING HELP YOU WITH SOME AIRCRAFT
BUT CAN'T REALLY SAY AS CNFJ CO-

ORIGINATING WITH I PRESUME KOREA
FOR SOME F-105. THIS UNOFFICIAL
BUT I THINK THAT WHAT WILL HAPPEN."

Pueblo-"ROGER YOUR LAST. ROGER
YOUR LAST."

1410 Kamiseya-"STILL READ YOU QRK FIVER
FIVER. GO AHEAD KEEP KW-7 ON THE
AIR LONG AS YOU CAN. WE STAYING
RIGHT WITH YOUR."

1411 Pueblo sent,"ROGER, ROGER,
WILL KEEP THIS UP UNTIL LAST
MINUTE WILL STAY UP UNTIL
THE LAST MINUTE AND SURE
COULD USE SOME HELP NOW."

1412 Kamiseya sent,"ROGER, ROGER.
WE STILL WITH YOU AND DOING
ALL WE CAN. EVERYONE REALLY
TURNING TO AND FIGURE BY NOW
AIR FORCE GOT SOME BIRDS
WINGING YOUR WAY."

At 1412 Kamiseya
commenced passing
chatter to COM7TH-
FLT via torn-tape
relay at HAVCOMM-
STA PHIL.

1413 Pueblo sent,"ROGER, ROGER,
SURE HOPE SO. WE PRETTY BUSY

WITH DESTRUCTION RIGHT NOW.
CAN'T SEE FOR THE SMOKE."

1414 Kamiseya sent,"ROGER, ROGER,
WISH I COULD HELP MORE. ALL
INFO YOU PASS BEING SENT TO
AREA COMMANDER AND THEY IN
TURN CO-ORGINATING FOR WHAT-
EVER ACTION GOT TO BE TAKEN.
SURE PROCESS ALREADY BEING
INITIATED FOR SOME IMMEDIATE
RELIEF. COMSEVENTHFLT, CNFJ,
AND NSA GROUP PAC ALL GOT
INFO RIGHT AWAY."

1415 Pueblo sent,"ROGER YOUR LAST
AND SURE HOPE SOMEONE DOES
SOMETHING. WE ARE HELPLESS
AT THIS TIME. CANNOT DO ANY-
THING BUT WAIT."

1417 Kamiseya sent,"WHO I GOT
THAT END OF CIRCUIT. WHAT
STATUS OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
LEFT TO DESTROY?"

1418 Pueblo sent,"WE HAVE THE KW-7

AND SOME CARDS IN THE 37 AND
14 (crypto equipments KWR-37
and KG-14) TO SMASH. I THINK
THAT JUST ABOUT IT."

1419 Kamiseya sent, "RIGHT. CON-
TINUE TO HANG TO P 7 I BUT-
TON. WE BE RIGHT THERE. YOUR
SIGNAL MIGHT GOOD AND HOPE
STAYS THAT WAY. YOU GOT ANY
FURTHER INFO THAT MIGHT HELP
EVALUATE SITUATION?"

Pueblo sent, "ROGER YOUR LAST.
WILL STAY WITH AS LONG AS I
CAN. WILL PUT (garble) ON AND
LEAVE THEM UNTIL I NEED YOU.

1420 Kamiseya sent, "CNFJ ADVISED
FIFTH AIR FORCE ALERTED RE-
PEAT CNFJ ADVISED FIFTH AIR
FORCE ALERTED."

At 1420 CNFJ noti-
fies CINCPACFLT of
incident by secure
phone.

1421- Pueblo made transmission that
1427 was completely garbled and
unreadable. Kamiseya made sev-
eral requests for a repeat.

1428 Kamiseya sent twice, "IF OPERATIONS PERMIT, CAN YOU PROVIDE CURRENT SITREP INCLUDING INTENTIONS KORCOMS IF POSSIBLE, AND INJURIES SUSTAINED."

1430 Pueblo sent, "ROGER AND DESTRUCTION OF PUBS HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE. SUSPECT SEVERAL WILL BE COMPROMISED." Kamiseya sent twice, "CAN YOU GIVE ME A LIST OF WHAT YOU HAVEN'T DESTROYED?"

1432 Pueblo sent, "HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO COME TO ALL STOP AND BEING BOARDED AT THIS TIME. BEING BOARDED AT THIS TIME." Kamiseya sent, "ROGER YOUR LAST. IT ON WAY TO CNFJ." Pueblo sent, "FOUR MEN INJURED AND ONE CRITICALLY AND GOING OFF THE AIR NOW AND DESTROYING THIS GEAR." (last transmission)
Kamiseya sent, "ROGER, GO AHEAD. CAN YOU TRANSMIT IN THE CLEAR?"
Kamiseya repeated calls for the Pueblo to transmit in the clear

for several hours.

3. Analysis -- What actions were possible?

Time to act before dark: 231330 to 231806 = 4h 36m

Time to act before seizure: 231330 to 231435 = 1h 5m

Time to act until Pueblo abeam Ung Do island:

231330 to 231645 = 3h 15m

Time to act until Pueblo moored at the pier:

231330 to 232030 = 7h

Appendix N: Pinnacle I
(230342Z)

Time of transmission:

From Pueblo: 0350Z.

From Kamiseya: 0440Z.

1. Delay in Kamiseya to readdress and retransmit
as Critic approximately 50 minutes.
2. Time of receipt by other addresses:

	Time of receipt	Delay from Pueblo
a. Commander Naval Forces, Japan.....	0413Z.....	23m
b. U.S.S. Enterprise.....	0530Z.....	1h 40m
c. Commander Seventh Fleet.....	0514Z.....	1h 24m
d. CINCPACFLT.....	0530Z.....	1h 40m
e. CINCPAC HQ.....	0600Z.....	2h 10m
f. Fifth Air Force.....	0515Z.....	1h 25m
g. Chief of Naval Operations.....	0533Z.....	1h 43m
h. Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	0642Z.....	2h 34m
i. Director NSA.....	0446Z.....	56m
j. White House.....	(1).....	(1)

(1) Not available

Appendix O: Pinnacle II
(230415Z)

Time of transmission:

From Pueblo: 0418Z.


From Kamiseya: 0436Z

1. Delay in Kamiseya to readdress and retransmit message as Critic--approximately 15 minutes (TOR of Pueblo message 0421Z).
2. Time of receipt by other addresses:

	Time of receipt	Delay from Pueblo
a. Commander Naval Forces, Japan....	0422Z.....	04m
b. U.S.S. Enterprise.....	0538Z.....	1h 20m
c. Commander Seventh Fleet.....	0524Z.....	48m
d. CINCPACFLT.....	0525Z.....	49m
e. CINCPAC HQ.....	0553Z.....	1h 17m
f. Fifth Air Force.....	0523Z.....	1h 08m
g. Chief of Naval Operations.....	0523Z.....	47m
h. Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	0557Z.....	1h 39m
i. Director NSA.....	0443Z.....	25m
j. White House.....	0443Z.....	25m
k. Secretary of Defense.....	0523Z.....	1h 05m
l. Deputy Secretary of Defense.....	0520Z.....	1h 02m

Appendix P: Enterprise Location

USS Enterprise was located 510 NM from Wonsan Harbor.



Appendix Q: Statement of General Wheeler

The testimony on this subject, as provided by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, U.S.A., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was as follows:

The Air Force had seven attack aircraft in the Republic of Korea, 16 attack aircraft in Japan, and 18 attack aircraft on Okinawa. Estimated time to target were 3 hours plus 38 minutes and 3 hours plus 44 minutes from Korea; 4 hours plus 45 minutes and 4 hours plus 55 minutes from Japan; and 4 hours plus 10 minutes from Okinawa staging through Osan. There were 35 strike aircraft on board Enterprise which could have reached the Wonsan area in approximately three hours. The U.S. Marine Corps had eight aircraft in Japan which would have required 2 hours plus 40 minutes and 2 hours plus 50 minutes depending upon the type of aircraft.

The U.S. Navy had Enterprise and one destroyer approximately 600 miles south of the incident. Additionally, there was one destroyer located 120 nautical miles south of Yokosuka, and three destroyers in port in Japan. Approximately 20 hours of steaming time would have been required for the nearest of these ships to reach the Pueblo.

Relative to the "hold" order on our air and sea forces that had been readied as a result of the Pueblo incident, this order was received by me from higher authority. This

hold order to U.S. Naval and Air Forces directed them to remain outside of an area within 80 nautical miles of the coast of North Korea north of a line extending east from the DMZ. It was issued by telephone at 1025 Washington time (1525Z) on the 23rd of January (25 minutes after midnight on 24 January Korean time) and followed up by a Joint Chiefs of Staff message at 1800 Washington time (2309Z) the same day.


The query was made in earlier sessions of the Subcommittee as to the authority of United States forces to go to the rescue of the Pueblo during the time she was being escorted into Wonsan Harbor inside the Korean-claimed 12-mile territorial seas. At the time of the attack by North Korean naval units, the United States had the historic right--codified internationally by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter--to take any action in self-defense proportionate to the attack and necessary to protect the ship. Whatever military steps the United States could have taken within these limits from the air or on the sea to prevent the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo would have been fully justified. There were no rules of engagement limiting going to the aid of the Pueblo during this time. From the time when the Pueblo first reported that North Korean naval personnel from North Korean naval units surrounding her had boarded at about 1345 Korean time (0445Z), the use of any force to prevent capture would have been fruitless and might have resulted in either sinking or badly damaging the ship and, at the same time, wounding or killing a substantial

portion of the Pueblo crew. The nearest U.S. ships were approximately 20 hours steaming time from the scene. For reasons which I will mention later, land or sea based aircraft could not have been used effectively prior to the time the ship entered Wonsan Harbor. The prime factor in any retrieval operation then became the safe return of the Pueblo crew.

The final point that I would like to discuss is the response time required to come to the assistance of the Pueblo. Thousands of man-hours have been expended reconstructing the mission of the Pueblo and the command and control aspects of the incident. Our investigations revealed that immediate response by aircraft was not possible because of a combination of many factors. Included were the relatively short time between the challenge to and the boarding of Pueblo, availability of friendly forces, the presence of hostile forces, weather, and the onset of darkness. Factors considered by all levels of command when the incident occurred were capabilities of friendly and enemy forces, time of day, weather, and probable hostile reaction. When these factors were assessed against actual times of events associated with the incident, time of receipt of the information that the ship was under attack and force response time, it was apparent to all levels of command that the Pueblo could not be retrieved by any action prior to the time that the ship entered Wonsan Harbor.

Appendix R: Communication Links

This chart represents a six unit communications net. To create the net each unit must make five separate one-to-one calls for a total of fifteen separate communication links.



Bibliography

BOOKS

Primary

Bucher, Lloyd M. Bucher: My Story. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970.

A very one-sided book written by Commander Bucher to explain and justify his actions during the attack of the U.S.S. Pueblo and while imprisoned in North Korea. The book is useful as important background information. It shows what motivated Commander Bucher to join the Navy, take command of the U.S.S. Pueblo and how he handled his imprisonment and the Board of Inquiry. He is very straight forward in his feelings about the men in his command. He explains what he felt motivated his men and their prejudices which are essential in looking at the other literature. Some of the points he claims in the book, however, are not consistent with his statements at the Board of Inquiry.

Harris, Eleanor Van Buskirk. The Ship That Never Returned. North Quincy, Mass.: Christopher Publishing House, 1974.

This is possibly the most emotional book written on the crisis. Mrs. Harris, LT Harris' mother, wrote

this book five years after the release of her son. Five years was obviously not enough time to remove her bias against the North Koreans. She is inconsistent in her facts and tries to make up for this fault by adding emotionalism. Overall the most biased book, it contains few facts to support her opinions.

Harris, Stephen R. My Anchor Held. Old Tappan, New Jersey: F. H. Revell Co., 1970.

LT Harris was the Officer in Charge of the Naval Security Group Detachment on board the ship. The board of Inquiry recommended that he be given a Letter of Reprimand, however, this was negated by the Secretary of the Navy. His book is written in defense of his actions on the U.S.S. Pueblo and while imprisoned. Overall an interesting book worth reading for personal information.

Hooper, Edwin B. Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965-1968. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

In his book, Vice Admiral Hooper, presents one chapter on the background and seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. He offers a quick history of other

intelligence ships emphasizing their capabilities and limitations. He adds a different view on the ship's equipment difficulties, especially the emergency destruction plan and equipment. The Vice Admiral is writing from an objective viewpoint, very much detached from the emotionalism involved in the ship's seizure.

Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1971.

Murphy, Edward R., Jr.; with Curt Gentry. Second in Command. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971.

LT Murphy does not pretend to write from an unbiased point of view. He immensely disliked and distrusted Commander Bucher, his Commanding Officer. Portions of his book were written to counter what Commander Bucher wrote in Bucher: My Story. He justifies his actions during the event and explains why the actual seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo never should have happened. His description of Commander Bucher's actions before, during and after the seizure are extremely critical. He justifies the decision of the Secretary of the Navy to "put the situation behind" the country by not prosecuting any of the crew as a "white-wash" of the true facts. He explains in detail many of the events which happened during and after the seizure,

from his point of view. His book is well worth reading especially if compared and contrasted with Commander Bucher's.

North Korean Central News Agency. Press Conferences; Reporters from many countries of the world meet crewmen of the U.S. imperialist armed spy ship "Pueblo". Pyongyang: 1968.

This book was written as a propaganda tool of the North Koreans. It consistently refers to the American prisoners as imperialism spies. It is an excellent source for understanding how the North Korean government viewed the incident. The statements made by the crew are exactly as reported in other sources, but the North Koreans' interpretation is extremely interesting.

Schumacher, Frederick C. Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the U.S.S. Pueblo. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1970.

LT Schumacher was the Operations Officer of the U.S.S. Pueblo. He was commended by the House Hearing Committee for his actions while imprisoned. The book is basically his account of the ship's seizure and the crew's imprisonment. The book contains many insightful

passages about the psychology of the ship's crew.

The U.S. Imperialists Bend Their Knees Again Before The Korean People. Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1969.

This short book was written by the North Korean government. Its bias is obvious, however, this does not detract from the importance of the book and its understanding of how the North Korean government perceived the U.S.S. Pueblo incident. It is one of the few documents written on the subject from the North Korean point of view.

Secondary

Armbrister, Trevor. A Matter of Accountability: A True Story of the Pueblo Affair. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970.

As a journalist, Mr. Armbrister set out to inform the public of the events leading up to, during and following the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. The easiest book to read and, since he interviewed most of the ship's crew, one of the most complete books on the subject. He presents the different viewpoints from which the seizure could have been viewed, i.e., from

Washington, D.C., the American HQ in Japan, the U.S.S. Pueblo, the Seventh Naval Fleet and the Fifth Air Force. It is sometimes hard to follow the sequence of events because many things are going on at once, however, Mr. Armbrister does an excellent job of organizing the book. This is probably the most objective, complete book on the subject.

Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982.

This book quickly goes over the U.S.S. Pueblo crisis, however, the information is well organized and objectively stated. It explains the planned total deployment of the U.S.S. Pueblo and presents a history of what happened to the other ships in the same class as the U.S.S. Pueblo. As a retired U.S. Navy Chief, Mr. Bamford presents in four pages some interesting facts about the U.S.S. Pueblo incident in a clear, straight forward manner.

Brandt, Ed. The Last Voyage of the U.S.S. Pueblo. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969.

This is one of the most objective books on the actual seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo and the crew's imprisonment in North Korea. The story is told from

the viewpoint of fifteen enlisted crew members on the ship. An excellent book to study how the crew members saw the takeover and imprisonment.

Crawford, Don. Pueblo Intrigue. Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, 1969.

Mr. Crawford studies the religious faith of the crew, and how it was affected by the capture.

Gallery, Daniel U. The Pueblo Incident. New York: Doubleday, 1970.

The book is extremely comprehensive, it covers the total crisis from the ship's sailing out of Japan until the Board of Inquiry. His opinion are clearly presented and backed with many facts.

REPORTS

Primary

U.S. Congress. Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo of the Committee on Armed Services. House of Representatives, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

This report is essential reading in understanding the total story of the U.S.S. Pueblo. Many high-ranking military and civilian officials testified for the purpose of explaining what National Security problems were involved in the loss of the ship, and what corrective measures needed to be taken. The whole issue of the Code of Conduct for military and civilians was discussed and recommendations were made. This is probably the most complete piece written on the events of the seizures of the U.S.S. Pueblo giving many charts using one common time, thus making the events easier to follow than in the other books. The reader must go through this report slowly, but it is an extremely objective, straight-forward and unbiased piece.

Secondary

American Society of International Law. "The Pueblo Seizures: Facts, Law, Policy." Sixty-Third Annual Meeting Report, First Session. Washington, D.C., April 24, 1969.

This report is superb for a quick overview of the events of the actual seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. The writers take two separate views concerning the legality of North Korea's attack on the ship, and also states the legal responsibilities of the United States

government in respect to the U.S.S. Pueblo's actual mission. The authors appear to look at the situation as legal authorities with minimal biases present.

Basedow, Henry J. Selected I & W Readings. Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence School, 1978.

Mr. Basedow's major reason for writing this article was to point out indications and warning failures, therefore, he used the U.S.S. Pueblo crisis as an example. He presents in only a few pages the North Korean warnings before the seizure of the ship. The information is well organized, however, no background substantiation was given.

Belden, T. G. Crisis Conferencing and the Pueblo Case. Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis Systems Evaluation Division, 1970.

This is an analysis of the communication problems on the U.S.S. Pueblo. It uses the unclassified Pike Committee Hearings and Report as supportive information. The author was paid to make recommendations based upon his efforts to determine if "conferencing problems incurred during the U.S.S. Pueblo crisis". His bias comes from the fact that in order to make the report pay for itself, he had to find

communication problems with the U.S.S. Pueblo incident. At first look this would make the reader very suspicious, however, the author clearly supports his findings.

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"Crisis in Korea". National Review. Vol. 20. p. 124.
February 13, 1968.

Department of State. "Crew of U.S.S. Pueblo; U.S. Position of Facts Unchanged." Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 60. p. 1, January 6, 1969.

"Electronic Revolution; Electronic Surveillance by the Pueblo and the EC-121". New Republic. Vol. 160. p. 8. May 24, 1969.

"Heroes or Survivors?" Time. Vol. 93. p. 19. January

10, 1969.

"The Importance of Power". Time. Vol. 91, No. 5, pp.11-17, February 2, 1968.

This article is written from an emotional viewpoint which appears to be extremely critical of the U.S. government and its handling of the incident. The article was published immediately after the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo and Commander Bucher's confession. It illustrates what the American public was seeing in the press immediately after the ship's seizure. It compares the U.S.S. Pueblo seizure with the U-2 shoot down and the Bay of Pigs. The article also details for the reader the construction and mission of the ship. Its main thrust is to give the human interest side of the story by interviewing Commander Bucher's family and friends, and in explaining the human events in the seizure concluding with how the U.S. government reacted.

It is a source for the sentiments expressed in American press at the time of the U.S.S. Pueblo's seizure, but the reader is reminded that the writer is trying to explain a very complex event in six pages.

Littell, Robert. "Prometheus Bound." Newsweek. 5 FEB 68.

This article is extremely comprehensive, and appears to try to report the situation objectively. It explains "Snooper" planes and ships dealing with what they do and how they do it. Also explained in the article are President Johnson's political attacks and what physical actions were taken by the United States government after the U.S.S. Pueblo seizure. It presents an excellent history of the conflict between North and South Korea. The article concluded with the public's reaction to the attack and how the relatives of the ship's crew were handling the personal stress.

New York Times. January 25, 1969, p. 28, col. 1.

New York Times. January 30, 1969, p. 34, col. 2.

New York Times. June 9, 1970, p. 6, col. 4.

New York Times. October 27, 1971, p. 34, col. 1

"Return of the Pueblo's Crew". Time. Vol. 93. p. 18,
January 3, 1969.

S. H. Moffett. "Report from Korea: No Panic Over Pueblo".
Christian Today. Vol. 12, p. 37, February 16, 1968.

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"Trouble in Korea; More Light on the Pueblo". U.S. News and World Report. Vol. 64, p. 44, February 19, 1968.

United Nations Security Council. "Seizure of Naval Vessel; Security Council Considers Complaint by United States Against North Korea". UN Monthly Chronicle. Vol. 5, p. 3, February 1968.

Winkler, Frank. New York Times. January 1, 1969, p. 20, col. 6.

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U.S. News and World Report. January 26, 1981, p. 57, col.2.

Strauch, Ralph E. The Operational Assessment of Risk: A Case Study of the Pueblo Mission. Rand Corp., March 1971.

In this article Mr. Strauch deals with how the risk assessment was made for the U.S.S. Pueblo mission and gives specific recommendations on the ways of improving the risk assessment system. The risk assessment system has been changed since the incident

but the article is still worth reading. The article is extremely objective and logical in its approach which makes it slow and tedious reading.

Weinkaub, Bernard. New York Times. July 17, 1977, p. 1, col. 1.

FILMS

McGee, Frank. Pueblo: A Question of Intelligence. National Broadcasting Company, 1969.

This film is definitely written from the correspondent's point of view. The U.S.S. Pueblo crisis is studied from the angle of whether or not the public should have been aware of the mission. It does present excellent short historical film clips of the actual events, however, it uses the prisoner releasing scene three different times. The film is excellent as a primary source and poses many questions for the researcher.

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